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PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

A RETROSPECT AND OUTLOOK 



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PHILIPPINE AFFAIES 



A RETROSPECT AND OUTLOOK 



AN ADDRESS 



BY 



JACOB GOULD SCHURMAN 

PRESIDENT OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
PRESIDENT OF THE FIRST PHILIPPINE COMMISSION 






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NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNERS SONS 

1902 



THIP ' 'BRAKY 0F 
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TWO CortM RECEIVE* 

FEB. 8 1902 

Cef^VKJHT ENTRY 

|CLA»S ^ XXO. No. 

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Copyright, 1902, by 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



Published, February, 1902 



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PRINTING AND ROOKBINDING COMPANY 

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This address, though somewhat curtailed, was deliv- 
ered before the members of Cornell University on the 
morning of Founder's Day, January 11th. It was re- 
peated, in substance, before the Reform Club of Bos- 
ton oil the evening of January 20th. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Tntroductoey 1 

Diplomatic Negotiations 5 

The Questions of Immediate Independence and 

an American Protectorate for the Filipinos 18 

Plan of Government for the Philippines ... 28 

The Present Situation in the Philippines . .49 

The Future of the Philippines 81 



INDEPENDENCE FOE THE FILIPINOS. 

" Tlie Philippine Islands, even the most patriotic [Fili- 
pinos] declare, cannot at the present time stand alone. 
They need the tutelage and protection of the United 
States. But they need it in order that in due time they 
may, in their opinion, become self-governing and inde- 
pendent. For it would be a misrepresentation of facts 
not to report that ultimate independence — independence 
after an undefined period of American training — is the 
aspiration and goal of the intelligent Filipinos who to- 
day so strenuously oppose the suggestion of independence 
at the present time." — Report of the First Philippine 
Commission, Vol. I., Part IV., Chapter II., p. 83. 



PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

A RETROSPECT AND OUTLOOK 

INTRODUCTORY. 

Ladies and Gentlemen: 

It is now just three years ago since I was summoned 
to Washington, and, to my great astonishment, invited 
by President McKinley to accept the presidency of a 
commission he proposed to send to the Philippine Isl- 
ands. The treaty under which this oriental archipelago 
had been brought under American sovereignty was not 
yet ratified by the Senate; but its ratification was as- 
sured, if not before, at least after the fourth of March, 
when the membership of the Senate would undergo a 
change favorable to the administration. In view of 
this consummation — I mean the ratification of the 
treaty — President McKinley desired to have a body of 
civil advisers — a kind of local cabinet — in the Philip- 
pines. 

I need not say that I felt highly honored by the gra- 
cious proposal of President McKinley. Such a mark of 
confidence would have been very complimentary under 
any circumstances, but my sense of the honor which the 
President had in mind was deepened by the circum- 



2 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

stance that it came absolutely "unsought; indeed, I had 
no knowledge or intimation that the President was con- 
templating the despatch of a commission to the Philip- 
pines. 

The President discussed with me the names of a num- 
ber of hypothetical colleagues, and, having volunteered 
assurances in that regard which I should scarcely have 
presumed to solicit, he desired to know whether I would 
accept the presidency of the Commission. I replied 
that I feared it would be difficult, perhaps impractica- 
ble, for me to get away from Cornell University, and 
that in any event I could not stay away beyond the open- 
ing of the next academic year. But even if a leave of 
temporary absence could be secured (and the President 
said he would send a message to the Board of Trustees), 
there was, I observed, another obstacle that might prove 
irremovable. " To be plain, Mr. President/' I con- 
tinued, " I am opposed to your Philippine policy : I 
never wanted the Philippine Islands." " Oh," replied 
the President, " that need not trouble you; I didn't 
want the Philippine Islands, either; and in the protocol 
to the treaty I left myself free not to take them; but — 
in the end there was no alternative." My own solution 
of the problem had been to leave the Philippines in the 
hands of Spain, with the reservation of one or more 
naval stations at suitable points for the United States; 
but the President met this view with the declaration 
that the American people who had gone to war for 
the emancipation of Cuba would not, after Commodore 



INTRODUCTORY 3 

Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, consent to leave the 
oppressed Filipinos any longer under the domination 
of Spain. What remained? If Spain were driven out 
of the Philippines, and American sovereignty were not 
set up, the peace of the world would be endangered. 
This consequence the President drew, and then pointed 
out at some length that the Commission he proposed to 
send to the Philippines would have the unique oppor- 
tunity and the rare duty of advising the Government 
and people of the United States, at a critical period in 
their history, in regard to the gravest problem confront- 
ing them. The Commission was to act as an advisory 
cabinet in the Philippines; and, besides the question of 
suitable local governments, the President was especially 
desirous of recommendations in regard to the political 
relations which, in view of Philippine conditions, it 
would be wise to establish between the United States 
and the 8,000,000 brown men in Asia, for whom the 
treaty of Paris invested us with sovereign responsibility. 
The treaty eliminated Spain ; it was now for the United 
States to frame and carry into effect a policy in regard 
to the Philippines. To aid the Government at Wash- 
ington in shaping that policy, and to co-operate with the 
naval and military authorities at. Manila in the effective 
extension of American sovereignty over the archipelago, 
were the principal functions which the President was to 
assign to the Commission. 

I have other than personal reasons for reciting these 
details. They show, in the first place, that President 



4 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

McKinley's motive in compelling Spain to cede to the 
United States her sovereignty over the Philippine Isl- 
ands was the humanitarian object of liberating the Fili- 
pinos from misgovernment and oppression; and, in the 
second place, that up to January, 1899, no definitive 
Philippine policy had been adopted or even thought out 
by the President, whose mind had not, indeed, travelled 
beyond the first step of relieving Spain of her sover- 
eignty over the archipelago. It was still open to us, 
in dealing with the Filipinos, to grant them indepen- 
dence, to establish a protectorate over them, to confer 
upon them a colonial form of government, or to admit 
them to the dignity of a territory, or even a State, in 
our Union. Absolutely nothing was settled, except 
that Spain should cede to the United States the sover- 
eignty which for a dozen generations she had enjoyed 
and exercised over the islands. And this absolute carte 
blanche which existed as to the future disposition of the 
Philippines, and the apparent desirability of eliminating 
Spain from the question, undoubtedly induced some 
senators of anti-expansionist sentiments to vote for the 
ratification of the treaty of Paris, which secured the 
constitutional two-thirds vote of the Senate on February 
6, 1899. 



DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS 5 

DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. 

At that date, however, we were on the Pacific en 
route to the Philippines. After brief stops at Yoko- 
hama and Shanghai, we arrived at Hong Kong on 
February 22d. It was almost noon; and, as the hour 
struck, the war-ships of all nations, gay with bunting, 
burst into multitudinous and ear-splitting thunder which 
reverberated from the lofty peak of the island to the 
rocky shores of the Chinese mainland with all the roar 
and din of heaven's own artillery. Here in this British 
port in Asia the nations were celebrating the birthday 
of Washington! But I cannot describe the splendor 
of that scene — and still less the patriotic emotions it 
awakened in our hearts. 

We now stood at the gateway of the Philippines. 
But the Philippine situation had completely changed 
since we left America. On February 4th, two days 
before the ratification of the treaty of Paris by the 
Senate, the Philippine army, which had hitherto been 
an aid or a neutral, attacked the American army in 
Manila. And before that, on January 21st, the in- 
surgents had set up a Philippine Republic, based on a 
constitution adopted by a congress meeting at Malolos, 
which claimed the right to exercise sovereign jurisdic- 
tion over the archipelago. Emilio Aguinaldo, the for- 
mer military dictator, the leader of the insurrection of 
1896 as well as that of 1898, was President of the Phil- 
ippine Republic and commander-in-chief of its military 



6 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

and naval forces. Aguinaldo enjoyed the confidence of 
the insurgents and their sympathizers and abettors — 
all of whom seemed at that time to be Tagalogs — in 
virtue of his patriotic services, his attested honesty, 
and his remarkable gift of surrounding himself with 
able coadjutors and administrators. And so, instead of 
peace and a gradually extending American sovereignty, 
our Commission found awaiting us war and a Philip- 
pine Republic in effective control at least of the Taga- 
log provinces in the heart of Luzon. The authority of 
the United States was limited to the city of Manila, 
and the people of Manila — Tagalog as they are — were 
in sympathy with the insurgents. 

The instructions of the President to our Commission 
being flexible, we recast our plans to meet existing cir- 
cumstances. We soon discovered that the insurgents 
grossly misconceived the intentions of the United States 
in regard to the Philippines. To enlighten them and 
to win their confidence became, therefore, our primary 
aim./' Happily, Manila, to which we were at first re- 
stricted, is to the Philippines what Paris is to Prance. 
Beginning, then, with Manila, we endeavored to com- 
mend to those suspicious brown men a policy of liberty 
and home rule under American sovereignty. We ex- 
hausted every art and method of conciliation to win 
them to the cause of peace. And having secured the 
confidence and friendship of the leading Filipinos in 
Manila, having convinced them of the humane and 
beneficent intentions of our Government, having satis- 



DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS 7 

fled them that American sovereignty was only another 
name for the liberty of Filipinos, we set in motion, 
through their agency, currents of good-will, amity, and 
reconciliation which overflowed the domains of the 
Philippine Republic, gradually spread throughout Luzon 
and the Yisayas, and reached even to the well-guarded 
camps of the insurgents in arms. Though we began 
with Manila — and that was a matter of expediency as 
well as of necessity — I need scarcely say that our ob- 
jective point was the Philippine Republic. To win the 
Philippine Republic over to the cause of peace with the 
recognition of American sovereignty was the supreme 
object of all our endeavors. 

/On one point, however, the Commission was inexor- 
able. American sovereignty over the Philippines hav-\/ 
ing been established by treaty was a fact which was no 
longer open to discussion by Pilipinos in arms. / And in 
meetings of the Commission with them I always ruled 
that question out of order and refused to permit any 
speaker to debate it. Of course there was another good 
ground for this attitude, namely, that the Tagalog insur- 
gents and their Philippine Republic did not represent the 
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, but only a minor- 
ity of them. Furthermore, it had become clear to the , 
Commission that, from a Philippine point of view, in- * 
dependence, for some time at least, was an impossibility. 
For these reasons, and also because Aguinaldo's men 
were rebels in arms, we insisted that the recognition by 
them of American sovereignty was the first condition 



8 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

of peace. On the other hand, we assured them that on 
their recognition of American sovereignty, we should 
consult them regarding the future government of the 
archipelago, which, we were sure, the United States 
would make as free, liberal, and democratic as the most 
intelligent Filipino desired. These efforts at concilia- 
tion culminated in the issue at an opportune time — 
when the American army was driving the Philippine 
army before it — of a proclamation by the Commission, 
in which the aim was to clear away misunderstand- 
ings — and you cannot even imagine how grossly the 
Filipinos misinterpreted American purposes — to exhibit 
beyond the possibility of misapprehension the liberal, 
friendly, and beneficent attitude of the United States 
to the people of the Philippine Islands. 

This proclamation, which I had drafted after many 
conferences with Filipinos and careful study of the con- 
stitution of the Philippine Republic and other insurgent 
documents, produced remarkable effects. In the first 
place, it emboldened the Filipinos we had been winning 
over in Manila and made them active missionaries in the 
cause of peace under American sovereignty. More 
than that, it gave them a platform to stand on; an as- 
surance of justice, liberty, and self-government under 
the American flag, which contrasted strongly with the 
spoliation and despotism which the insurgent govern- 
ment already practised. But, best of all, it enabled 
them to form a party in support of American sover- 
eignty over the Philippines. They afterward called 



DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS 9 

themselves the Federal Party; but they were then 
known as Autonomists. One of the ablest and most 
helpful of them all, Mr. Florentino Torres, now a judge 
of the Supreme Court, in making last spring a report to 
General McArthur on the origin and formation of the 
Federal Party, wrote as follows: 

" They called themselves ' Autonomists,' for they 
presented themselves to the Commission, of which Mr. 
Schurman was president, in 1899, laid their ideas and 
aspirations before it, and accepted the basis for a gov- 
ernment announced in the proclamation of said Com- 
mission, and the principles upon which an autonomic 
administration is founded.' 7 * 

As Judge Torres goes on to explain, the Autonomists 
were afterward joined by disillusionized insurgents: 

" The idea of independence having been laid aside, 
and American sovereignty having been unconditionally 
accepted, there was no essential disagreement between 
those who had come over from the revolutionists and the 
so-called Autonomists, whom time and circumstances 
have proved to have been right, and from the very be- 
ginning there has been no difficulty in coming to an 
agreement among themselves for the purpose of found- 
ing and organizing the political party which was 
planned and which, by common consent, they called the 
Federal Party. This party is based upon the principles 
of self-government, essentially and substantially the 
same as the principles which were laid down in a pro- 

* Annual Reports of the "War Department for the fiscal year ended 
June 30, 1901. Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the 
Army. In four parts. Part II., p. 120. 



10 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

posed federal constitution for the future government of 
this archipelago, which was drawn up and submitted to 
the former Schurman Commission by the Autono- 
mists.' 7 * 

But among the insurgents themselves the efforts of 
our Commission to bring about peace and reconciliation 
produced results not less favorable and far more dra- 
matic than those achieved in the formation of a pro- 
American party in Manila. Let me remind you that 
the time was April and May, 1899. Malolos had been 
taken by our troops and the insurgents had fled to the 
province of Neuva Ecija, where their government was es- 
tablished at San Isidro. The head of Aguinaldo's cab- 
inet was Apolinario Mabini, a young man of fragile and 
paralytic frame, but of a keen, subtile, and logical intel- 
lect, imaginative too, more speculative, perhaps, than 
practical, a shaper of policies rather than a leader of men, 
except in so far as he exhibited inflexible constancy to the 
cause of Philippine independence and a fierce, irrecon- 
cilable, and inextinguishable hatred of the Government 
of the United States. As long as Mabini remained at 
the head of Aguinaldo's cabinet there was no possibility 
of inducing the insurgent Filipinos to accept American 
sovereignty. But when the proclamation of our Com- 
mission reached the insurgent ranks — and a large num- 
ber of copies circulated among them — the leaders per- 
ceived that under American sovereignty they would 
enjoy greater liberties than they had ever dreamt of 
* Annual Reports of the War Department. Part II., p. 121. 



DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS 11 

under Spanish rule, and, if not a nominal independence, 
at least a firmer and surer self-government than their 
own Philippine Republic could ever guarantee. The 
demoralization of the Philippine army was meanwhile 
going on apace, thanks to the continuous victories of 
General Lawton and General MacArthur. And the 
Commission, who had timed the issue of the proclama- 
tion, after conference with General Otis, so that the 
hand of conciliation might be felt at the same time as 
the hand of force, watched anxiously for the result on 
the insurgent authorities. Nor had we long to wait for 
the realization of our most sanguine expectations. On 
May 1st the Congress of the Philippine Republic voted 
for the cessation of war and the adoption of peace on 
the basis of our proclamation. Mabini's cabinet was 
overturned, and a new cabinet was formed, pledged to 
peace and reconciliation, with Paterno at its head and 
Buencamino as his most important colleague. The 
story is told by Buencamino himself in the following 
words : 

" About that time, in the month of April, a vast 
number of copies of the proclamation of the first Com- 
mission, presided over by Mr. Schurman, reached the 
insurgent field; this document, although vague in its 
details, was perfectly clear in its liberal and democratic 
principles. 

" Don Felipe Buencamino and Don Pedro Paterno, 
without any previous agreement, saw in this proclama- 
tion a door through which they could enter into friendly 
and harmonious relations with the Americans. All the 



/" 



12 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

members of Congress adopted this policy, with the ex- 
ception of a few partisans of Mabini, who was at that 
time president of the cabinet. 

" Hence it is that at the first meeting of Congress in 
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, the first day of May, 1899, it 
was resolved to change the war policy for one of peace 
with the United States; and this change having been ac- 
cepted by Don Emilio Aguinaldo, it resulted, as was 
natural, in a change in the cabinet, Senor Mabini being 
substituted by Don Pedro Paterno, who, with Don 
Felipe Buencamino, proclaimed the new policy of con- 
ciliation. 

" The first political act of the new cabinet was the 
appointment of the Commission to come to this city to 
confer with the American authorities to agree upon 
terms of honorable surrender, this noble mission having 
been confided to Senor Buencamino and others of his 
colleagues in the cabinet."* 

Nothing seemed needed to complete the success of 
our Commission. We had won over the Philippine Re- 
public to the policy of peace and recognition of Ameri- 
can sovereignty over the Philippine Islands. This pol- 
icy had been adopted by the Congress of the Philippine 
Republic by a vote almost unanimous. President Agui- 
naldo had concurred. A cabinet in sympathy with the 
new policy, and pledged to carry it out, had taken the 
place of Mabini and his colleagues. And a commission 
of cabinet members had been appointed, and were now 
ready to set out, to carry the tidings to us in Manila. 

* Annual Reports of the "War Department for the fiscal year ended 
June 30, 1901. Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the 
Army. In four parts. Part II., p. 118. 



DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS 13 

But the kaleidoscope shifts, and behold a tragedy! 
In its patriotic effort to bring about peace, the Philip- 
pine [Republic itself suffers collapse. Done to death by 
its own false friends, I shall never forget that its last 
expiring voice was for peace and reconciliation on the 
basis of the proclamation issued by our Commission. 
But what the congress, cabinet, and president of the 
Philippine Republic so unanimously resolved, Luna, 
the general commanding their army, as completely 
frustrated. He arrested the delegates who had been so 
solemnly authorized by congress, cabinet, and president 
to proceed to Manila, accused them of treason, and sen- 
tenced some to imprisonment and others to death. 

The friends of peace and reconciliation were, indeed, 
avenged. Luna himself was assassinated in the follow- 
ing month by adherents of Aguinaldo. Following the 
law of self-preservation Aguinaldo immediately took 
Luna's place as general in active command of the 
forces. Republic or no republic, liberty or despotism, 
national prosperity or national misery, the insurgents, 
still in arms, were ready to sacrifice everything to their 
own selfish ambition, ignorance, and insane folly. The 
officers would not abandon their high positions to sink 
into their former insignificance in the civil community ; 
and the soldiers preferred living on others to working 
for themselves. Military power released from civil 
authority always lapses into a selfish and remorseless 
tyranny. And nowhere is this law more tragically il- 
lustrated than in the Philippines. Such an unholy 



14 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

carnival of militarism, despotism, brigandage, cruelty, 
and wholesale intimidation of peaceful and unoffending 
inhabitants as the disorganized insurgent bands have 
since enacted in different parts of the Philippine Islands 
is without parallel in Occidental history — and finds a 
parallel in Asia alone. 

The poor Philippine Republic was not only dead, but 
— what is equally important in oriental politics — it 
never again pretended to be alive. ^ America, indeed, 
honest and patriotic, but sadly misinformed, citizens 
still talked of the new republic of the Orient and that 
youthful father of his country, Emilio Aguinaldo. 
But the cold fact is, that since those tragic happenings 
in the province of Nueva Ecija, in the month of May, 
1899, there has not been even the semblance of a Phil- 
ippine Republic; all clean gone are its congress, cabinet, 
president, and other civil officers; while the opposition 
to the establishment of American sovereignty has pro- 
ceeded, not so much from the patriotism of the people as 
from the selfishness of individuals, from the lust of mil- 
itary power and oppression, and from the spirit of rob- 
bery and brigandage. 

Nothing remained throughout the area occupied by 
the insurgents but to meet force with force; and this 
was done first by General Otis, and later, with brilliant 
results, by General MacArthur, who had the rare good- 
fortune, through General Funston, of capturing Agui- 
naldo. But the Philippine Islands are a vast archipel- 
ago; and the insurgent operations never embraced the 



DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS 15 

whole of it. Tlie insurgents were indeed active in many 
provinces of Lnzon; and, of the Yisayan Islands, Panay, 
Cebu, Bohol, Samar, and Leyte, were partly under their 
influence or control. But even in 1899, when their 
power was at its height, they were not admitted to 
Xegros, which declared for American sovereignty, and 
voluntarily raised the American flag; and, with insignif- 
icant exceptions, they got no hold of the great island 
of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, or the remote isl- 
and of Palawan. These southern islands are occupied 
by Mohammedan and heathen tribes. Mindanao has a 
sprinkling of Christian Filipinos on the coasts, but no 
more; Balabac and the Sulu Archipelago are Moham- 
medan, and Palawan is settled on the sea-coast by Mo- 
hammedans, and in the interior by heathen. 

The insurgents, however, were making efforts to win 
over the Christian Island of Xegros and to enlist the sup- 
port of the southern islands. Already they held Zam- 
boanga, on the western tip of Mindanao, and some other 
points. The Commission thought it desirable to send 
encouragement to Xegros, and to quicken and strengthen 
the loyalty it had so early manifested. And it seemed 
especially desirable to secure the Mohammedan chief- 
tains of the southern islands, more particularly the Sul- 
tan of Sulu, who claimed a kind of suzerainty over them 
all. On this business I set out early in June, my col- 
leagues remaining in Manila to attend to other matters. 

I met with enthusiastic receptions in Bacolod, the capi- 
tal of Xegros, at Silay on the north and Dumaguete on 



16 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

the south of the island, as well as at other points; and 
at all these towns I had good opportunities of proclaim- 
ing to the people the beneficent intentions of our Gov- 
ernment and assuring them of the liberty and prosperity 
which would follow peace under American rule. I 
visited the towns of Ilo-Ilo and Cebu, which were the 
only other points we at that time held in the Visayas, 
and then proceeded to Mindanao, Sulu, Palawan, and 
the Calamianes. My especial object was to induce 
the Sultan of Sulu to enter into an agreement ac- 
cepting American sovereignty. I knew the terms of 
the agreement which he had made with Spain some 
years before. Under these circumstances I told the 
Sultan of the war between the United States and 
Spain, and of the change of sovereignty in the Phil- 
ippine Islands consequent upon that war. He said 
that Spain had been an old and inveterate enemy of the 
Sulus, and he spoke boastfully of the issues of then- 
contests with her. I pointed out that, as the United 
States desired only its own rights, on which, however, 
it would insist, there was no reason why the Sultan 
should not be our friend, for the United States would 
hold inviolable his rights, and scrupulously respect the 
religion, the customs, and the sentiments of his people. 
I suggested a renewal of the agreement he had made 
with Spain. To this he at first demurred; he wanted 
better terms; more particularly he desired to make Mai- 
bun (his capital), or Siassi, a free port of his own. I re- 
plied that it would be out of the question for the sover- 



DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS 17 

eign power to abdicate or part with, its jurisdiction over 
any of the harbors or territorial waters of the archipel- 
ago. He then suggested other modifications in his own 
interest. But, when all were politely but firmly reject- 
ed, the Sultan finally said that if he could not secure any 
better terms, he would be willing to acknowledge Amer- 
ican sovereignty in the terms of the agreement he had 
made with Spain. 

I congratulated him on his wise decision, expressed 
my admiration of the beauty of his charming island, 
and suggested that its resources were capable of indefi- 
nite development, if capital and proper skill were only 
applied. He spoke of the havoc wrought by pestilence 
among his people, and added, with a mingled air of 
pathos and helplessness, that he did not even know their 
numbers, for, unlike more advanced peoples, they had 
never had a census. 

I cabled the result of my interview to Washington, 
and recommended that this plan of making agreements 
be followed with the other chieftains in the southern 
islands. In a short time the military authorities began 
to carry out this policy; and as a result, the fierce and 
implacable Moros of Sulu, Palawan, and Mindanao 
never became enemies of the United States. Thus the 
great southern islands of the archipelago were saved 
to us. Censorious critics blamed us for making a treaty 
with the Sultan of Sulu and not emancipating his 
slaves! The so-called "treaty" was simply an amica- 
ble acceptance by the Sultan of American sovereignty 



18 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

over his islands in the same terms in which, after many 
bloody contests, he had been forced to recognize the 
sovereignty of Spain. As to the abolition of slavery 
— and I rode through plantations worked by slaves — 
had I mooted such a policy at that meeting in June, 
1899, I might have kindled a terrible Mohammedan 
war. Contact with Christian civilization will undoubt- 
edly lead to emancipation — which some of the datos 
have since proclaimed — and I thought the gradual 
abolition of slavery by peaceful methods better than 
the provocation of a war of Mohammedans against 
Christians, which an insistence on immediate emanci- 
pation would in all probability have produced. 

THE QUESTIONS OF PHILIPPINE INDE- 
PENDENCE AND AN AMEEICAN PKO- 
TECTOEATE. 

I have no intention of describing the work done by 
the first Philippine Commission. In accepting its final 
report early in 1900 and discharging it, President Mc- 
Kinley, with the generous appreciation that character- 
ized the man, spoke in highly laudatory terms of the ser- 
vice the Commission had rendered to the Government 
and to the country, and invited us to retain our places 
in a second Commission which, however, nearly all of 
us were obliged to decline. Apart from the diplomatic 
and executive functions of the first Commission, and its 
confidential advices to "Washington, the final report of 



PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE 19 

four printed volumes may be cited as evidence of the 
industry and fidelity with which we studied the Philip- 
pine question in its many-sided complexity and its in- 
exhaustible difficulty. 

It fell to me to investigate, and report upon, two ques- 
tions of intense interest and of transcendent importance. 
One was the form of government — municipal, provin- 
cial, and general — which should be established in the 
Philippine Islands. The other, and more fundamental, 
question concerned the political relations which ought to 
obtain between the Philippine Islands and the United 
States. The results of my inquiries were, after adop- 
tion, embodied in the report of the Commission, and 
published first in the preliminary report,* and afterward 
in the final report, where, under the heading of " The 
Government of the Philippine Islands/' they occupy 
nearly half of the first volume. The two questions were 
studied together, and in each case the determining fac- 
tors were the actual circumstances and conditions of the 
inhabitants of the archipelago and the sentiments and 
ideals of their most intelligent spokesmen. 

The question of the political relations of the United 
States to the Philippine Islands, to which I had neces- 
sarily given much thought and study, became the domi- 
nant issue in the presidential campaign, which began 
soon after the presentation of the report of our Commis- 
sion. On that question I had gone to the Philippines 
with decided preferences. As I had been averse to ac- 

* See the section on " Capacity for Self-government," pp. 181-183. 



20 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

cepting from Spain sovereignty over the archipelago, 
so I was desirous of finding a way to escape the burden- 
some responsibility which I believed we had assumed. 
Two questions were constantly recurring to my mind: 
Might not the United States grant independence to the 
Filipinos? Or, if that were impracticable, might we 
not surrender our sovereignty and establish a protecto- 
rate? 

What I have already said of the collapse of the Phil- 
ippine Republic, in May, 1899, throws some light on 
these questions. » That unhappy organization never had 
extensive jurisdiction, except in ink and paper. But 
after the spring of 1899, it abdicated even its literary 
existence. On whom, then, could the United States have 
conferred independence, had it so desired? The Moham- 
medan and heathen tribes in the southern islands — 
more than a third of the area of the entire archipelago — 
were not hostile, and their datos and chieftains were 
being secured by agreements, after the model of our 
first agreement with the Sultan of Sulu. Or, if we con- 
fine attention to the Christianized Philippines, namely, 
Luzon and the Yisayas and the smaller adjacent islands, 
there was no political organization representing their 
inhabitants — the defunct Philippine Republic was al- 
most altogether a Tagalog organization — on whom the 
trust of sovereignty might have been devolved. There 
was not even a single military leader whom all accepted. 
Thus at the present time General Lukban, who is fight- 
ing us in Samar, and General Malvar, in southern Luzon, 



PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE 21 

are playing independently their own hands. What rea- 
sonable man, indeed, could have expected harmonious 
co-operation from Visayans, Tagalogs, Vicols, Ilocanos, 
and the other peoples of Luzon and the Yisayas, who 
was aware of their ancient rivalries and jealousies, their 
mutually unintelligible languages, and the isolation in 
which they lived in consequence of the lack of decent 
means of communication? 

There was really no political organization to endow 
with the function of sovereignty, had the United States 
desired to confer sovereignty upon the Filipinos. And 
men of education and men of property were very em- 
phatic in their rejection of such a gift, whenever the 
hypothesis was presented to them. Let me repeat what 
I said in the report of the Commission:* 

" While the peoples of the Philippine Islands ardent- 
ly desire a full measure of rights and liberties, they do 
not, in the opinion of the Commission, generally desire 
independence. Hundreds of witnesses testified on this 
subject to the Commission and its individual members, 
and, though they represented all possible varieties of 
opinion — many of them being in sympathy with the in- 
surgents — they were uniform in their testimony, that in 
view of the ignorance and political inexperience of the 
masses of the people, the multiplicity of languages, the 
divergencies of culture and mode of life, and the obsta- 
cles to intercommunication, an independent sovereign 
Philippine State was at the present time neither possible 
nor desirable, even if its poverty and internal weakness 
and lack of coherence would not invite, and the dissatis- 
*Vol. I., pp. 82-83 ("The Government of the Philippine Islands "). 



^ 



!> 



22 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

faction of aliens entail, the intervention of foreign 
powers, with the inevitable result of the division of the 
archipelago among them and the disappearance forever 
of the dream and hope of a united and self-governing 
Philippine commonwealth. The Philippine Islands, 
even the most patriotic declare, cannot, at the present 
time, stand alone. They need the tutelage and protec- 
tion of the United States. But they need it in order 
that, in due time, they may, in their opinion, become 
self-governing and independent. Por it would be a mis- 
representation of facts not to report that ultimate inde- 
pendence — independence after an undefined period of 
American training — is the aspiration and goal of the 
intelligent Filipinos who to-day so strenuously oppose 
the suggestion of independence at the present time." 

But if immediate independence for the Pilipinos were 
an absolute impossibility (unless the aim were to invite 
anarchy and chaos, to be followed by the absorption of 
the archipelago at the hands of the great powers of Eu- 
rope), might not an American protectorate over the 
archipelago be a better solution of the problem than the 
retention of that sovereignty which Spain had trans- 
f erred to us by the terms of the treaty of Paris? This 
solution, which was subsequently embodied as a plank 
in the democratic national platform, engaged much of 
my attention in the year 1899. It had the apparent 
merit of relieving us of the onerous and thankless under- 
taking of governing the Pilipinos. Por that reason it 
appealed strongly to my own sympathies; and my judg- 
ment was greatly impressed by the success of the British 



AMERICAN PROTECTORATE 23 

protectorate which Sir Andrew Clarke had established 
over races kindred to the Filipinos in the Federated 
Malay States. And Englishmen, whom one meets 
everywhere in the Orient, were confident that what they 
had done in Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and Negri Sem- 
bilan, we ought to do in Luzon, the Yisayas, and the 
rest of the Philippine Islands. With my own predilec- 
tions, and under arguments so cogent, I was quite open 
to persuasion that an exchange of our sovereignty for 
a protectorate over the Philippine Islands might be our 
wisest policy, and that, both from its inherent desira- 
bility and the probability, as demonstrated by experi- 
ence among other Malayans, of its producing the best 
results. But the more I tested this policy in the light 
of actual Philippine conditions, the less ground I per- 
ceived for the hopes its first formulation had awakened. 
In a measure, however, this policy, in spirit, if not 
in the letter, had been adopted, as I have already ex- 
plained, in dealing with the inhabitants of the Sulu 
Archipelago, Mindanao, and Palawan. To take the 
first and typical case, we recognized the Sultan of Sulu 
as the " king and shepherd of his people " (if I may use 
an Homeric phrase of so unclassical a community) ; and 
so far as we govern the tribes within his jurisdiction, we 
govern them through the Sultan. We have made simi- 
lar agreements with Dato Mandi and other chieftains 
in Mindanao and perhaps Palawan. And this policy is 
susceptible of extension to all the tribes, heathen as well 
as Mohammedan, which inhabit those southern islands. 



24 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

But, as will be recognized when once pointed out, this 
is a policy which presupposes monarchs or chieftains. 
It can be applied only to peoples who render obedience 
to monarch-like rulers, whether they be called princes, 
khedives, sultans, datos, or rajahs. The position is 
generally hereditary, and this is the case with the sul- 
tanate of Sulu, as it is with the corresponding position 
of rajah in the Federated Malay States. Through such 
a single and permanent executive or hereditary ruler it 
becomes possible for the protecting power to have fixed 
relations with the protected community. A State 
whose supreme power is divided among executives and 
fluctuates from time to time, would wait long in the 
market before finding a protector. A protectorate pre- 
supposes a definite and permanent ruler to protect; and, 
if we may judge from the examples of India, the Malay 
Peninsula, Egypt, and other parts of Africa, it is espe- 
cially congenial to hereditary rule. 

The chieftaincies and sultanates, which still survive 
in Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu group (where 
Spanish sovereignty scarcely extended into the interior, 
and was effective only on the coast), existed throughout 
the entire archipelago at the time of the Spanish con- 
quest. But the Spanish system of government was un- 
congenial to the system of native rulership, and by 
degrees the native potentates disappeared throughout 
Luzon and the Yisayan Islands, and all the region in 
which Spanish dominion was effective. Thus the Chris- 
tianized Filipinos, who number over 6,000,000 souls. 



AMERICAN PROTECTORATE 25 

are to-day, as I wrote in the report of the Commission,* V 
" a pure democracy, without distinctions of birth or 
rank — a mass of people without hereditary chieftains or 
rulers. The Spanish governor-general once ruled them 
with the aid of soldiers, civilians, and ecclesiastics from 
Spain, and now that Spanish sovereignty is gone, there 
are no constituted authorities, no natural leaders, who 
con speak for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Agui- 
naldo's influence over the Tagalogs might, indeed, have 
been utilized, had he not made war upon their liber- 
ators; and there are other natives who enjoy much 
prestige among the Yisayans, Yicols, Pampangos, Pan- 
gasinanes, Ilocanos, and Cagayanes. But so long as 
obedience remains the essence of government, the fact 
is indisputable, that while the sultans of the Malay 
Peninsula ruled their own States, there was nothing 
corresponding to them in Luzon and the Yisayan Isl- 
ands, in which, therefore, the Americans were stopped 
from instituting a protectorate, even had they desired 
to copy in a territory over which they possessed sover- 
eignty the practice of the British in dealing with a 
territory over which they neither had nor pretended to 
have a shadow of sovereignty." 

For it must not be forgotten in this connection that 
while we went into the Philippine Islands with all the 
rights of sovereignty, Great Britain intervened in the 
affairs of the Malay States solely on the invitation of 
their chieftains. She instituted a protectorate over the 
Malay Peninsula because she had no sovereignty there, 
and because there existed in the sultans established 

*Vol. I., p. 101. 



V 



26 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

monarchs who desired, or were induced to ask for, her 
protection. And the problem of gaining the country 
and governing the people resolved itself simply into the 
problem of winning and then controlling the sultans. 

In the Malay States, Great Britain set up a protec- 
torate because they had sultans and she had no sover- 
eignty. In Luzon and the Yisayas there are no sultans, 
and the United States has sovereignty. The conclusion 
in favor of an American protectorate over the Chris- 
tianized Philippines is certainly not derived by parity 
of reasoning. 

I must, however, acknowledge that the policy of an 
American protectorate was very dear to the heart of the 
insurgents. But in citing the example of the Feder- 
ated Malay States, they were playing with a two-edged 
weapon. For each of the Malayan States has become 
a veiled crowned colony, in which, though everything 
is done in the name of the Sultan (who flies his own 
flag and enjoys increased income), the British authori- 
ties have exclusive control of taxation and expenditures, 
give " advice " which the Sultan must adopt, and even 
push their dominion to the extent of deposing the Sultan 
and settling the succession, or ordaining a general manu- 
mission of slaves. These essential features of the Brit- 
ish protectorate over the Federated Malay States were 
the last thing the insurgents desired to see incorporated 
in the scheme of an American protectorate over the 
Philippine Islands. The only kind of protectorate they 
ever attempted to formulate was one under which the 



AMERICAN PROTECTORATE 27 

United States, like a good angel, should incur all the 
responsibility of protecting a Philippine government 
(when one was created) against foreign nations, while 
the Philippine officials themselves collected all the rev- 
enues and exercised all the power. But, as I showed in 
the report of the Commission: 

" The idea of a protectorate entertained by the insur- 
gent leaders, under which they should enjoy all the 
powers of an independent sovereign government, and 
the Americans should assume all obligations to foreign 
nations for their good use of those powers, would create 
an impossible situation for the United States. Internal 
dominion and external responsibility must go hand in 
hand. Under the chimerical scheme of protection cher- 
ished by Aguinaldo, if a foreigner lost his life or prop- 
erty through a miscarriage of justice in a Philippine 
court, or in consequence of a governor's failure to sup- 
press a riot, then the United States would be responsi- 
ble for indemnity to the foreigner's government, though 
without possessing the power of punishing the offenders, 
of preventing such maladministration, or of protecting 
itself against similar occurrences in the future. ^sTor 
could the liability to foreign nations be reduced with- 
out permitting them directly to seek redress; and such 
a course would, it is to be feared, speedily lead to the 
appropriation of the Philippine Islands by the great 
powers who would not need to seek far for pretences 
for intervention. 

" Undoubtedly the raising of the American flag in 
the Philippine Islands has entailed great responsibilities 
upon us; but to guarantee external protection while re- 
nouncing internal dominion is no way of escaping from 



28 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

them; on the contrary, while you pull down the flag, 
you only pile up difficulties."* 

PLAN OF GOVEENMENT FOE THE 
PHILIPPINES. 

This conclusion made the question of government a 
very important one. As I have already stated, it was 
my duty to write that portion of our report. The Com- 
mission felt strongly that civil government should be 
established at the earliest possible date. Military rule 
is always unsatisfactory, and the Philippine reformers 
had, in the days of Spanish dominion, always denounced 
it, and insisted on civil government as the indispensable 
guarantee of their rights and liberties. Of course they 
were no more tolerant of the American government of 
military occupation. And the Commission fully sym- 
pathized with their aspirations for a government regu- 
lated by formal and public law, to take the place of the 
arbitrary orders of the military commander. After 
working out a scheme of civil government, which the 
Commission adopted, I wrote as follows in regard to the 
time and place of putting it into operation: 

" The Commission recommend that in all parts of 
Luzon and the Visayan Islands where American occu- 
pation is effective, this scheme of civil government be 
put in operation where practicable, as soon as possible, 
though with the retention in every case of such military 
forces as may be deemed necessary for the protection 
of the civil communities thus organized. And as 

*Vol. I., p. 103. 



GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES 29 

American authority is extended over the remaining dis- 
tricts, islands, and peoples of the archipelago, there 
should be a corresponding extension of civil government 
until all the civilized peoples of Luzon, the Visayan 
Islands, and the coast of Mindanao enjoy the benefits of 
the territorial administration. There is no need to wait 
for the suppression of the insurrection in all the islands 
before giving civil government and local home rule to 
such as are at peace and are fit for it. Considering the 
varieties of the peoples and the friendliness of most of 
them to the United States, it would be both unjust and 
impolitic to treat them all alike as unworthy of civil 
government; and looking to the pacification of those 
still hostile, the Commission believes that no instrumen- 
tality would be so effective to that end as the establish- 
ment of civil government in the communities which are 
already friendly."* 

In outlining a scheme of civil government for the 
Philippine Islands, I first studied the system which 
Spain had established, and then noted and discussed the 
objections which Philippine reformers (especially the 
radicals and insurgents) made to that system and the 
modifications which they proposed for its improvement. 
I must refer to the report f for the details of the inves- 
tigation, but the following summary of the Spanish sys- 
tem of government for the Philippines — municipal, 
provincial, and general — is so brief that it may be cited 
here : 

" It goes without saying that the governor-general 
was appointed by the Spanish Government. He was 

* Keport, pp. 118-119. f See Vol. I., pp. 43-97. 



30 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

assisted by a council of administration, whose members 
were, in part, appointed by the Spanish Government, 
and in part elected by the provincial juntas, which the 
Spanish Government controlled. Spain also appointed 
the governor of every province; and of the council or 
junta which assisted the governor, only the minority 
of the members were elected — and these not by the peo- 
ple at large, but by the heads or mayors ( ( municipal 
captains ') of the towns of the province. Thus it was 
that neither in the government of the province nor in 
the general government of the archipelago had the in- 
habitants of the Philippines any control, and scarcely 
even a voice. Indeed, those provincial councils, for 
which the heads of the municipalities were permitted to 
elect a minority of the members, had only advisory 
powers in relation to the governor, whose decision in 
all matters was supreme; and, besides advising the 
governor, the councils had no other function but to 
inspect the administration of the affairs of the mu- 
nicipalities. 

" Even the municipal councils were, therefore, not 
bodies controlled by the people. In addition to constant 
inspection and direction from the provincial junta, 
every municipal council was liable to warning, admoni- 
tion, fines, and suspension, at the hands of the governor 
of the province. And to make the control from above 
still more effective, the governor-general exercised juris- 
diction over all the municipal councils, and was vested 
with power to discharge members, or even the entire 
council itself. 

" Even when municipal government had been thus 
circumscribed, the masses of the people had no share in 
it. Suffrage was limited to the ( principal people ' of 



GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES 31 

the town, and elections were indirect. The l principal 
people ' were present and past office-holders and persons 
paying fifty dollars land tax. The l principal people,' 
as thus constituted, elected by ballot twelve delegates, 
and these elected the municipal tribunal, which actually 
governed the .town." * 

In this system of government the Philippine re- 
formers demanded a number of changes. Some of the 
features of the system which contented them are more 
surprising than the features they objected to. They 
naturally demanded a large measure of decentralization 
with increased autonomy and independence for the pro- 
vincial and the municipal governments. They demand- 
ed direct elections by properly qualified voters. But, 
though they favored an extension of the franchise, it 
was only to recognize other tax-payers than the land- 
owners (to whom the Spanish law restricted the fran- 
chise, along with former office-holders), and to admit as 
voters persons holding academic degrees, or perhaps 
even possessing an elementary education. 

But still more surprising than the reformers' aversion 
to universal suffrage is their rejection of absolute home 
rule for their towns and provinces. The constitution 
of the Philippine Republic expressly provides for " in- 
tervention " of the central government in the affairs of 
the provincial and municipal government. This idea 
of " intervention," which is foreign to us, is funda 
mental to the whole political life and thought of the 

* Idem, pp. 182-183 (Preliminary Report). 



32 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

Filipinos. Acquired from long experience with Spanish 
methods of government, the idea has taken such a firm 
hold of the mind of the Filipinos that they find govern- 
ment of any kind inconceivable without it. 

]STow if the general government which the United 
States sets up for the archipelago is to exercise inspec- 
tion, regulation, and control over the functions of the 
provincial and municipal governments — and all that is 
implied in the notion of " intervention " — surely these 
latter may be intrusted with a large measure of auton- 
omy without any danger to the public interests. And 
so we recommended that Philippine towns and provinces 
should be vested with substantially the same powers as 
are enjoyed by towns and counties in the United States. 
As to suffrage, while favoring its extension, we recom- 
mended its limitation by a property or educational qual- 
ification. I endeavored to sum up the treatment of pro- 
vincial and municipal government as follows: 

" It is necessary, in dealing with this subject, to recall 
what has already been said of the idea entertained by 
the Filipinos of the necessity of intervention and control 
on the part of the Manila government over the doings 
of the provincial and municipal authorities. Even in 
local affairs, it is not an absolute but a qualified home 
rule they desire; they look for supervision and regula- 
tion from the central government at Manila. If this 
expectation is satisfied by the continuance of the custom 
of inspection and ultimate control from Manila, and 
this the Commission deem absolutely essential, it will 
be safe, and, in the opinion of the Commission, expedi- 



GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES 33 

ent and desirable to grant to the inhabitants of the 
archipelago a large measure of home rule in local affairs. 
Their towns should enjoy substantially the rights, priv- 
ileges, and immunities of towns in one of the Territories 
of the United States. 

" As to the provinces, the Commission is of the opin- 
ion, in view of the facts submitted in the preceding sec- 
tions, that they should be turned into counties (with or 
without consolidation or division, as circumstances of 
size, population, race, physical features, etc., may de- 
termine) and vested with substantially the same func- 
tions as those enjoyed by a county in one of the Terri- 
tories of the United States. This system might be 
applied to Luzon and the Yisayan Islands at once, with 
some exceptions, though inconsiderable, in the mountain 
regions, and a beginning might also be made on the 
coasts of Mindanao, while the Sulu Archipelago, calling 
for special arrangements with the Sultan, need not be 
considered in this connection. It is, of course, intended 
that the Filipinos themselves shall, subject to the gen- 
eral laws which may be enacted in this regard, manage 
their own town and county affairs by the agency of 
their own officers whom they themselves elect, with no 
contribution to this work from American officials ex- 
cept what is implied in the Philippine conception of 
intervention and control on the part of the central gov- 
ernment at Manila. The suffrage should be restricted 
by educational or property qualifications."* 

As to the central or general government for the arch- 
ipelago, I early became convinced of the necessity of a 
radical change in the Spanish system. After an ex- 
* Report. Vol. I., pp. 97-98. 



34 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

tended examination of that system, I summarized its 
defects in the following terms: 

" The scheme of government instituted by Spain for 
the Philippines was, in itself, far from perfect, and in 
its practical operations it was open to the gravest objec- 
tions. It failed to accomplish even the primary ends 
of good government — the maintenance of peace and 
order and the even administration of justice; nor can 
there be any doubt that it proved an engine of oppres- 
sion and exploitation of the Filipinos. It took their 
substance in the form of taxes and contributions, and 
gave no equivalent in return. The preceding sections 
have shown the use made of the public moneys, which 
was in general an unproductive one. The people paid 
heavy taxes and were subject to annoying and vexatious 
restrictions on their rights; yet the country was not de- 
veloped, roads were not made, popular education was 
not established. It almost seemed as though the great 
trust of government had been perverted into a mere in- 
strument for the benefit of the governing class at the 
expense of their subjects. The revenues were swallowed 
up by salaries, most of which seemed unnecessary. 
The very category of public works is only another des- 
ignation for salaries. There were in reality no public 
works. The revenues of the archipelago were exhausted 
by unproductive expenditures on naval and military es- 
tablishments, on salaries and pensions, on the church, 
and on the colonial office in Madrid. And the people 
governed had no redress, as they had no control or voice 
in the matter. 

" The most prominent defects in this scheme of gov- 
ernment were: (1) The boundless and autocratic powers 
of the governor-general; (2) the centralization of all 



GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES 35 

governmental functions in Manila; (3) the absence of 
representative institutions in which the Filipinos might 
make their needs and desires known; (4) a pernicious 
system of taxation; (5) a plethora of officials who lived 
on the country, and by their very numbers obstructed, 
like a circumlocution office, the public business they pro- 
fessed to transact; (6) division of minor responsibilities 
through the establishment of rival boards and offices; 
(7) the costliness of the system and the corruption it 
bred; and (8) confusion between the functions of the 
State and the functions of the church and of the relig- 
ious orders."* 

The first reform, that on which all others depend, is 
the admission of the Filipinos themselves to a participa- 
tion in the functions and control of government. They 
have reached a stage of progress and civilization, at least 
in Luzon and the Yisayas, which entitles them to rep- 
resentative institutions. And the constitution of the 
Philippine Republic was responsive to popular demand 
in providing for a representative legislature, which was 
designated an assembly. Had Spain granted the reit- 
erated demand of Philippine reformers for representa- 
tive institutions, it is highly probable that her flag would 
to-day be waving over the archipelago. And in this 
connection I must reiterate what I have elsewhere said 
of our own obligation to understand, appreciate, and 
sympathize with the ideas and sentiments of the Fili- 
pinos : 

" The United States can succeed in governing the 
Philippines only by understanding the character and 

* Report. Vol. I., pp. 81-82. 



36 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

circumstances of the people and realizing sympathetical- 
ly their aspirations and ideals. A government, to stand, 
must be firmly rooted in the needs, interests, judgment, 
and devotion of the people; and this support is secured 
by the adaptation of government to the character and 
possibilities of the governed — what they are, what they 
have it in them to become, what they want, and, not 
least, what they think they are entitled to have and 
enjoy."* 

Of course, so long as the United States retains sov- 
ereignty over the Philippine Islands, so long must its 
control of the central or general government be absolute 
and indisputable. The responsibilities of sovereignty 
cannot be discharged without corresponding powers. 
And in any delegation of political privileges to the peo- 
ple of the dependency, the rights reserved to the sov- 
ereign power must be plenipotent and unquestionable. 
We invite the Filipinos to co-operate with Americans in 
the administration of general affairs, from Manila as a 
centre, and to undertake, subject to American control, 
the administration of the local affairs of the towns and 
provinces. But the United States is, and, so long as it 
retains sovereignty over the archipelago, it must remain, 
the predominant partner. 

The problem, then, is to reconcile American sover- 
eignty with Philippine autonomy. If we look to the 
British Empire for a model, we find the self-governing 
colony, like Canada, which is so independent that Great 
Britain exercises only a nominal sovereignty over it ; or 
* Eeport. Vol. I., p. 82. 



GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES 37 

we find the crown colony, like Hong Kong, or the de- 
pendency, like India, in which the natives are without 
representative institutions and are ruled by the arbitrary 
will of the sovereign or his representatives. The Govern- 
ment of Canada or Australia is really independent or 
sovereign, but filial piety and community of race, inter- 
est, and sentiment serve to maintain the nominal connec- 
tion with the mother country. Were the inhabitants of 
these colonies of a different race and color from the 
British, they would long ago formally have set up as 
independent and sovereign communities, as, indeed, the 
Boers, European though they are, have during the last 
two or three years made incredible exertions to do in 
South Africa. The United States, therefore, could not, 
without imperilling, or even abdicating, its sovereignty, 
confer upon the Filipinos representative institutions and 
responsible government like that of Canada or Aus- 
tralia. On the other hand, to govern them as the peo- 
ple of India are governed by Great Britain would be to 
defeat their aspirations, to belittle their capabilities, and 
to frustrate a principal object of their revolt against 
Spanish authority, which was the occasion of their fall- 
ing under the sovereignty of the United States. 

To reconcile the political rights and privileges of the 
Filipinos with the inviolable sovereignty of the United 
States, I turned to the congressional acts organizing the 
successive territories of the Union, beginning with the 
classic Jeffersonian measure of 1804 for the organiza- 
tion of the territory of Louisiana. For every necessary 



38 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

and desirable feature to be incorporated in a bill organ- 
izing the government of the Philippine Islands I found 
a precedent in the several acts under which Congress 
had organized the territories. Thus I recommended 
that Congress should retain the right to veto all Philip- 
pine legislation; that the Filipinos should be represented 
by a delegate in Congress; that the governor of the 
Philippine Islands should be appointed by the President 
of the United States, and should have at least a restric- 
tive veto on the acts of the Philippine legislature; that 
this legislature should consist of a lower house, or assem- 
bly, elected by the people, under suitable educational 
and property qualifications, and of an upper house — a 
legislative council or senate — in part elected by the peo- 
ple and in part nominated by the President of the 
United States; and that members of the governor's cab- 
inet or the heads of departments, who were to be partly 
Americans and partly Filipinos, should also be members 
of the upper branch of the legislature. 

These several features were discussed with prominent 
and progressive Filipinos, some of whom were good 
enough to embody their views in a model constitution 
or law for the organization of the Government of the 
archipelago. This bill of theirs is printed as an appen- 
dix* to the report of the Commission, and I have dis- 
cussed it at some length in the chapters on the plan of 
government for the Philippines. My own views, which 
the Commission adopted, were outlined as follows: 

* See Exhibit VI. (Vol. L, pp. 216-228). 



GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES 39 

" From the very outset, however, it will be safe and 
desirable, in the opinion of the Commission, to extend 
to the Filipinos larger liberties of self-government than 
Jefferson approved of for the inhabitants of Louisiana. 
Assuming that in the Sulu Archipelago, and in such 
portions of Mindanao and Palawan as are still occupied 
by tribal Indians, the Government will be conducted 
through the agency of their sultans, datos, or chiefs, it 
is to the remainder of the Philippine Islands, more par- 
ticularly to Luzon and the Yisayas and the coasts of 
Mindanao, that the territorial form of government is to 
be adapted. Now, the Commission believes that the 
people of these regions, under suitable property and edu- 
cational qualifications, should be permitted to elect at 
least the members of the lower branch of the territorial 
legislature. Paterno's scheme of government, as has 
been already explained, demanded a legislature elected 
by the people for the making of laws on local subjects. 
He seems to have had in mind a legislature with a single 
chamber, which is also the organization of the legislat- 
ure in the constitution of the so-called Philippine Re- 
public. But the model constitution (Exhibit VI.) pre- 
pared for the Commission by those Filipinos who sought 
to adjust the claims of the insurgent leaders to the rights 
of American sovereignty provides for a bicameral legis- 
lature, whose branches are designated, respectively, the 
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The latter is to 
be composed of one hundred and ten members, elected 
by the people, who are apportioned among the eleven 
regions into which this constitution redistricts the archi- 
pelago as fairly as may be in proportion to their popula- 
tion, the distribution, however, being subject to modifi- 
cation hereafter when a correct census shall have been 
taken. 



40 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

" But this constitution, which provides for popular 
representation in the lower chamber, does not make the 
Senate or upper house wholly elective. Of its twenty- 
two members, the eleven regions or electoral districts 
are to elect one each, and the other eleven are to be ap- 
pointed by the American governor-general, and, when 
appointed, to enjoy a life term. It would harmonize 
better with American practice to have these appoint- 
ments made by the President; and there seems no good 
reason why the term of office should not be the same as 
that of elective senators, which the constitution fixes at 
four years. But here the important thing to emphasize 
is the proposal in a constitution, which comes from radi- 
cal Filipinos, that the proper United States authority 
should appoint half the members of the Senate. 

" This constitution also provides that the secretaries 
or members of the cabinet of the governor-general may 
be members of either chamber; and if not members, 
shall have the right to sit and speak in either chamber. 
AYith such safeguards in American hands, the qualified 
veto power which this constitution gives the governor- 
general (which includes the right to suspend the law for 
a year, even after its passage by a two-thirds vote of the 
legislature over his veto) would probably be adequate 
for the purposes of good government, especially since, 
under the territorial plan of government, Congress may 
(and should) retain the right to veto all territorial legis- 
lation. But for that very reason, in addition to other 
good grounds, the Filipinos should be represented by a 
delegate in Congress. 

" It is important to add, as a further illustration of 
the aversion (which amounts almost to abhorrence) of 
the Filipinos to military government, that this constitu- 
tion provides that the American governor-general shall 



GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES 41 

be ' a civilian/ just as the Negros constitution also de- 
clared, in its bill of rights, that ' The military power is 
subordinate to the civil, and cannot use its military 
functions to deprive the citizen of his civil and political 
rights.' 

" The changes suggested in the Jeffersonian scheme 
of government for Louisiana, in the light of the ideals 
formulated by prominent and progressive Filipinos — 
that is, an elected lower house with an upper house half 
elected and half nominated — would practically convert 
the scheme into a territorial government of the first 
class. And this, after due consideration of circum- 
stances and conditions in the Philippines, is what the 
Commission earnestly recommends."* 

But while our territorial form of government fur- 
nished the type of organization the Commission recom- 
mended for the Philippines, we insisted that the Philip- 
pine government should be held completely aloof from 
the American system. In so far as the United States 
governed the islands, we were strongly of the opinion 
that it should govern them at arm's length. Anything 
like the mingling of Philippine affairs with American 
affairs would, in the judgment of the Commission, prove 
a serious mistake. The archipelago, we thought, should 
remain, politically, as separate from the United States 
as India is from the United Kingdom. As it is the 
policy of our republic to maintain a national develop- 
ment unmixed with Asiatic immigrants, so it is to the 
interest of the Filipinos to have opportunity for a full 
and independent development of their own individual 
*Vol. I., pp. 109-111. 



42 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

capacities, their own racial characteristics, and their 
own civilization. Their own organic life being thus 
recognized as self-contained and inviolable, when it 
reaches a degree of maturity qualifying them for inde- 
pendence, a new republic may arise in Asia without any 
shock to the United States of America. For if, under 
American training, the Filipinos come to fit themselves 
for sovereign independence, I have no doubt Americans 
will grant it if the Filipinos then desire it. 

The Commission recommended that the finances of 
the Philippine Islands should be kept entirely separate 
from those of the United States. In that connection I 
wrote as follows: 

" There are two fundamental principles on which a 
successful administration of the finances of dependent 
territories must rest. First, their finances must be man- 
aged, not for the advantage of the sovereign power, but 
for the benefit of the people and the development of the 
country whose destinies have been committed to its 
supreme control. Up to the eighteenth century all the 
great colonizing powers thought of their colonies as 
estates to be farmed for the benefit of their European 
proprietors. This theory cost England her first colonial 
empire in America, and then she abandoned it. Spain 
retained it, and her colonial empire has dropped from 
her grasp. There is no instance in history of the suc- 
cessful government of a colony where profit to the 
parent State or its citizens has been a leading considera- 
tion. 

" The second vital principle of the financial adminis- 
tration of dependent territories is that they should be 



' 



GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES 43 

made self-supporting; and to accomplish that object 
should be the principal aim of the United States in the 
financial administration of the Philippines — and to ac- 
complish it while developing the resources of the coun- 
try and making public improvements. The detailed 
examination of Philippine revenues given in an earlier 
chapter shows clearly that the archipelago will be easily 
capable of maintaining itself. It has also a large public 
domain which will be of great value when the building 
of railroads and the making of highways render it ac- 
cessible." * 

I also argued against the assimilation of the customs 
duties and internal-revenue taxes of the Philippine Isl- 
ands to those of the United States: 

" It has been the practice hitherto to assimilate the 
customs duties of new territories to those of the United 
States. But, as already shown, this practice rests only 
on convenience and expediency; it is not a requirement 
of the constitution, which calls only for uniformity of 
duties, imposts, and excises throughout the States. 
The Commission has, however, carefully considered the 
feasibility of assimilating the tariff of the Philippines to 
that of the United States. The differences, however, 
appear to be fundamental and irreconcilable; the tariffs 
are as far apart as the corresponding economic, indus- 
trial, and social conditions of the two countries. 
And so long as the existing chasm remains between the 
economic and social conditions of the Philippines and 
those of the United States, so long will it remain im- 
practicable to identify their tariffs. These conditions 
are not more fatal to uniformity of protective tariffs 
* Report. Vol. I., p. 118. 



44 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

than to uniformity of revenue tariffs; for they make it 
equally impossible to devise a uniform dutiable list of 
revenue-producing commodities. Accordingly the Com- 
mission recommends that at the present time no attempt 
be made to assimilate the customs duties of the Philip- 
pines to those of the United States. A similar recom- 
mendation, and for similar reasons, is also made in 
regard to the internal-revenue taxes of the two coun- 
tries." * 

But, after all, it is men that make good and bad gov- 
ernments. If, therefore, honest and capable adminis- 
trators are not secured and retained in office in the Phil- 
ippine Islands, the best scheme of government is bound 
to miscarry. The Commission felt, therefore, the great- 
est anxiety in regard to the civil service of the Philip- 
pines. We recognized that the patronage or spoils sys- 
tem would prove absolutely fatal to good government 
in this new oriental territory. Such a system is a vast 
handicap to any government; but the incapacity it tol- 
erates, the extravagance it breeds, the despotism, mis- 
government, and corruption in which it issues were 
certain, if the system were transferred by us to the 
Philippines, to alienate and embitter the inhabitants, 
and to necessitate, in consequence, large armies to keep 
them in subjection. 

It seemed likely to aid in the establishment of the 
business or merit system in the Philippines if it were 
made known at the outset that, under the scheme of 
government recommended by the Commission, compar- 

* Report, pp. 116-117. 



GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES 45 

atively few positions would be open to Americans. 
There would be needed, first, a very small group of 
able Americans to act as the organizing and directing 
brain of the civil administration of the Philippines; 
and, secondly, another small group to act as supervisors 
of native officials. How small the number of Ameri- 
cans required may be inferred from British experience 
in India and elsewhere. British India has an area of 
nearly 1,000,000 square miles and a population of over 
230,000,000. Yet the whole of the higher executive 
and judicial work in this immense area and over this 
enormous population is performed by 1,000 British offi- 
cials with the aid of natives, or an average of one British 
official to every 1,000 square miles of country and to 
every 230,000 inhabitants. A similar work in Ceylon 
is discharged, with 25,000 square miles and 3,500,000 
population, by seventy-one British officials. Having 
brought out these facts in the report, I added the fol- 
lowing recommendation in regard to the appointment 
and retention of Americans in the Philippine civil ser- 
vice: 

" Besides the executive, administrative, and judicial 
heads, who cannot be selected by means of competitive 
examinations, there will be a small number of offices in- 
termediate between the heads of departments and the 
great body of native officials, in all branches of the Gov- 
ernment for which it will be desirable to have American 
incumbents. Americans who are candidates for these 
positions should be subjected before admission to tests 
of fitness in the United States. They should then be 



46 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

promoted upon merit, and retained during efficiency and 
good behavior. In some cases it may be desirable, on 
account of their experience and training, to transfer 
men from the existing classified service to the Philippine 
service; and provision should be made to enable such 
officials to retain all their rights and privileges as classi- 
fied employees. By whichever method secured, Ameri- 
can officials in the Philippines should be offered salaries 
large enough to induce the most capable of their class, 
not only to enter and remain in the service, but to give 
an honest, effective, and economical administration, free 
from any taint of corruption. The appointment to the 
service of the best men available, without regard to poli- 
tics, and their retention, so long as they discharge their 
duties satisfactorily, are, in the opinion of the Commis- 
sion, indispensable principles of administration in the 
Philippines."* 

As I have already said, however, it was clear to us 
that nearly all the offices in the Philippines ought to be 
filled by Filipinos themselves. And it was the opinion 
of the Commission that no American should be ap- 
pointed to any office in the Philippines for which a rea- 
sonably qualified Pilipino could, by any possibility, be 
secured. As to the method of selecting and promoting 
natives, I wrote as follows: 

" It will be necessary to institute in Manila a civil- 
service board, or commission, analogous to that which 
exists in many of the States of the Union, whose duty 
it shall be to ascertain, by competitive examinations of 
a very practical character, the relative qualifications of 

♦Report. Vol.1., p. 114. 



GOVERNMENT FOB THE PHILIPPINES 47 

the Filipinos who seek admission to the public service. 
The primary demand will be for honesty and integrity; 
then for intelligence, capacity, and technical aptitude, 
or skill to perform the duties of the office to be filled. 
The competitive examinations will secure the selection 
of the fittest candidate, while it offers equal opportuni- 
ties to all; and though it will be a novelty to the Fili- 
pinos, who have been accustomed only to the patronage 
or spoils system of appointment, it cannot fail to com- 
mend to them a republican form of government, whose 
civil service is regulated by justice to all applicants for 
admission and directed solely to the welfare of the com- 
munity. 

" In the Philippine civil service there should be, be- 
sides provisions for tests of fitness before appointment, 
regulations to insure promotion upon merit and a tenure 
of office during efficiency and good behavior. It would 
be peculiarly detrimental to the public service in a ter- 
ritory circumstanced like the Philippines if, on political 
ground, natives were liable to removal from office as 
soon as they had learned its duties. However it be in 
the United States, it is absolutely essential to good gov- 
ernment in the Philippines that the natives should hold 
office during efficiency and good behavior."* 

The hope for the future of the Philippines is in edu- 
cation. The majority of the Philippine people are un- 
educated and very ignorant. But they have a high 
appreciation of education and a strong desire to have 
their children instructed. They feel that in a genera- 
tion modern education has revolutionized Japan. And 
a system of free schools for the people has been an im- 

* Report. Vol. I, pp. 112-113. 



48 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

portant element in every Philippine programme of re- 
form. And so, along with the merit system of civil 
service, the last recommendation in our plan of govern- 
ment for the Philippines was this: 

" So far as the finances of the Philippines permit, 
public education should be promptly established, and 
when established, made free to all. * * * English 
should be taught in the schools of the archipelago to 
the utmost extent feasible." * 

I conceived an exceedingly high opinion of the edu- 
cated Filipinos, who, however, form a small minority — 
4 possibly ten per cent., at most — of the people. And I 
recognized that the popular tendency to admire and al- 
most wbrship their educated men rendered these favored 
individuals the natural leaders of the people. To meet 
them in a* sympathetic and appreciative spirit, to satisfy 
their natural aspirations and ambitions, and to enlist 
them actively in the support of American sovereignty 
seemed to me the most important object for American 
authorities in the Philippines. Por myself I can say, 
with all sincerity, that to have met and known these 
educated Pilipinos, to have had social intercourse and 
official relations with them, I count one of the pleas- 
antest and most interesting recollections in my life. I 
described them, and indicated the service they might 
render us in the establishment of civil government in 
the Philippines, in the following terms: 

* Report, p. 121, p. 114. 



GOVERNMENT FOR THE PHILIPPINES 49 

" The educated Filipinos, though constituting a mi- 
nority, are far more numerous than is generally sup- 
posed, and are scattered all over the archipelago ; and the 
Commission desires to bear the strongest testimony to 
the high range of their intelligence, and not only to their 
intellectual training, but also to their social refinement, 
as well as to the grace and charm of their personal char- 
acter. These educated Filipinos, in a word, are the 
equals of the men one meets in similar vocations — law, 
medicine, business, etc. — in Europe or America. It is 
scarcely an exaggeration to say that these picked Fili- 
pinos will be of infinite value to the United States in 
the work of establishing and maintaining civil govern- 
ment throughout the archipelago. As leaders of the 
people, they must be the chief agents in securing their 
people's loyal obedience to the new government, to 
which, therefore, the dictates of policy, as well as plain 
common sense and justice, require us to secure their own 
cordial attachment. | And it has been a leading motive 
with the Commission in devising a form of government 
for the Philippines to frame one which, to the utmost 
extent possible, shall satisfy the views and aspirations 
of educated Filipinos. They believe that the territorial 
system herein set forth will accomplish that object."* 

THE PKESENT SITUATION IN THE 
PHILIPPINES. 

But I have already lingered long enough over the 
past. Much has happened in the two years since the 
first Philippine Commission presented its report. Gen- 
eral MacArthur and General Chaffee have conquered 

*Keport. Vol. I., p. 120. 



50 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

peace throughout almost all the islands and provinces 
of the archipelago. Judge Taft and his colleagues of 
the second Philippine Commission have done excellent 
work in the establishment and administration of civil 
institutions. And we of the first Philippine .Commis- 
sion have had the satisfaction of seeing the policies we 
recommended in regard to that terra incognita which 
we were the first civilian officials to investigate, largely 
adopted by the American people and put in operation 
by our successors. For the American people have re- 
jected the programme of immediate Philippine indepen- 
dence under an American protectorate; civil govern- 
ment has been established in all the pacified regions of 
the archipelago; the creation of a central government, 
indeed, still awaits action by Congress, but provincial 
and municipal governments have been organized along 
the lines we recommended; courts of justice have been 
instituted; an excellent system of civil service has been 
adopted; and free public schools, with thousands of 
teachers, both Filipinos and Americans, have been 
opened in all the pacified provinces. Though much re- 
mains to be done, much has already been accomplished 
in the Philippines since the treaty of Paris brought 
them under the sovereignty of the United States. , 

There are many aspects of the Philippine question as 
it stands to-day, and is likely to stand in the near future. 
Some of the more important of these I now propose to 
consider. And as fundamental to all others, I begin 
with the militarv situation. 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 51 

In 1899 our military forces in the Philippines were 
altogether inadequate to the work in hand. In 1900 
and 1901, reinforcements were sent, but the improve- 
ment of conditions last spring and summer rendered it 
unnecessary to despatch the maximum force authorized 
by the act of February 2, 1901, entitled " An act to in- 
crease the efficiency of the permanent military estab- 
lishment of the United States." And in his recent re- 
port, the Secretary of War states that " the army in the • 
Philippines has been reduced since my last report from 
2,367 officers and 71,727 enlisted men to 1,111 officers 
and 42,128 enlisted men." This force will be still fur- 
ther reduced through the expiration of enlistments and 
as a result of casualties, but the total enlisted strength 
will not fall below 32,079 men. A beginning has also 
been made in the creation of a native Philippine force, 
as authorized by section thirty-six of the act of Febru- 
ary 2, 1901. 

Whether these forces are sufficient for the duties as- 
signed to them must be left to the commanding-general 
to decide. And General Chaffee has shown himself 
entirely worthy of public confidence. Having said so 
much, may I also be permitted to add that, in dealing 
with Orientals, and certainly with Filipinos, it is always 
economical to have far more force than the actual mili- 
tary undertaking demands. The surplus strength is 
needed not for a physical but a psychological purpose — 
a purpose of transcendent importance. V With a super- 
abundance of force, you impress the natives with the 



52 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

plenitude of your power. Had this object been con- 
stantly kept in mind, had our army always been large 
enough to make an impressive exhibition of reserve 
strength, I have no doubt that our military task in the 
Philippines would have been both easier and shorter 
than it has actually proved. 

Not that I think a large army will be necessary when 
the archipelago has been once completely pacified and 
civil government is everywhere in successful operation. 
We have the experience of Great Britain in Asia for our 
encouragement. Only a few weeks ago Lord Curzon, 
the Viceroy of India, made a visit to Upper Burma — 
the former dominions of King Thebaw and the Shan 
States — traversing with ease and safety a country in 
which, fifteen years ago, violence, insurrection, and 
brigandage were chronic and apparently ineradicable — 
a country, too, in which a prolonged guerilla warfare 
was the result of British annexation. Under the present 
reign of peace, order, tranquillity, and contentment, it 
is obvious that the military force which Great Britain 
maintains in those regions may be much smaller than 
the minimum required a dozen years ago. In the same 
way the military forces have already been reduced in 
the older British colonies in Asia. The conquest and 
pacification of Ceylon was a long and difficult under- 
taking; but to-day, in Ceylon, with 3,500,000 inhabi- 
tants, the military force numbers only 1,700 officers and 
men (mostly British), with a volunteer corps of 1,200 
(mostly Asiatics), while the police force consists of 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 53 

about 1,600 officers and men (of whom only forty-two 
are European). In all India, with its population of 
300,000,000, the army scarcely exceeds 200,000 men, 
of whom only a third are British. Or take the Philip- 
pine Islands themselves before the insurrection, and we 
find that in 1895 Spain maintained an army of only 
13,291 men, of whom only 2,210, mostly of the artil- 
lery, were Europeans, the rest being natives. Now, 
when the United States has dowered the Eilipinos with 
the freest government in Asia, when prosperity has 
overlaid the hideous features of poverty and devastation 
which the insurrection has produced, it will be strange 
if a small military force is not sufficient to maintain 
order throughout the archipelago — and equally strange 
if the majority of the soldiers are not Filipinos. You 
may say this hopeful expectation is prophecy; but, if so, 
is it not, like scientific prophecy of natural events, a pre- 
diction based on the facts of experience under similarity 
of circumstances? 

Meantime let us be thankful that the work of pacifi- 
cation draws to its conclusion. On the fourth of last 
July General MacArthur was able to report that 

" The armed insurrection is almost entirely sup- 
pressed. At the present writing there is no embodied 
rebel force in all Luzon above the Pasig. In the De- 
partment of Visayas all is pacified, excepting only the 
island of Samar."* 

* Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901. Part II., 
p. 97. 



54 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

This exception ought to have embraced Cebu and 
Bohol also. And with that correction it would seem 
that throughout all the pacified regions the insurrection 
was not only suppressed, but, in all probability, it was 
permanently extinguished, for General Mac Arthur had 
got possession of the means of war. To take Filipinos 
prisoners is of little account; but to capture their rifles 
is a real victory; for men are plentiful in the Philip- 
pines, and rifles cost money, which is very scarce. It 
was, therefore, a most pregnant achievement that Gen- 
eral MacArthur chronicled when he said that 

" The American army has, up to date, secured some 
23,000 guns, and, in all probability, will secure several 
thousand more."* 

The last report of the Taft Commission, which comes 
down to October 1, 1901, confirms the earlier report 
and hopeful forecast of General MacArthur. In the 
Yisayas it is true Bohol and Cebu have, on account of 
insurgent activities, been since turned back by the civil 
to the military authorities. But the province of Batan- 
gas, with the adjacent part of Tayabas and Laguna, is 
the only portion of Southern Luzon in which the insur- 
rection still lingers, though there are insurgents in the 
sparsely settled and unexplored neighboring island of 
Mindoro. Not only has Aguinaldo been captured, but 
Tinio, Trias, Cailles, and Belarmino have surrendered; 
and of all the prominent insurgent leaders there remain 

* Annual Reports of the War Department, 1901. Part II., p. 103. 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 55 

only Malvar, the military boss of Southern Luzon, and 
Lukban, who, since 1898, if not longer, has been the 
absolute despot of the remote, turbulent, and always 
more or less independent island of Samar. 

Those Yisayan Islands — Samar, Cebu, and Bohol — 
have an entire population of nearly 1,000,000; Batangas 
has about 300,000; and, perhaps, it would be fair to 
allow from 200,000 to 400,000 for the parts of La- 
guna, Tayabas, and Mindoro which are affected by the 
disturbances centring in Batangas. You see, then, the 
military situation. There is still fighting in provinces 
inhabited by 1,500,000 or 1,750,000 people; there is 
peace in the remainder of the archipelago inhabited by 
6,500,000 people.* The pacified regions have an area 
of over 100,000 square miles; the area of insurrectionary 
depredations does not exceed 15,000 or 20,000 square 
miles. I acknowledge, however, that we are always 
liable to trouble in the great island of Mindanao (which 
is almost as large as Luzon), and in Palawan, about 
both of which we know very little; but at present the 
Mohammedan and heathen tribes in those islands are 
quiet. The Taft Commission, therefore, feels justified 
in reporting that 

" Outside of the five provinces named [Cebu, Bohol, 
Samar, Batangas, and probably Mindoro] there is peace 
in the remainder of the archipelago. All insurrectos 
have surrendered, and in most of the provinces, except 

* On the old assumption that the population is about 8,000,000. 
The latest figures are lower, about 7,000,000. 



56 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

among the Lake Moros, it is entirely safe during the day 
for travellers unattended to go from one town to an- 
other."* 

May this pax Americana become complete and uni- 
versal throughout the archipelago! 

Let us turn from the military to the civil situation 
of the Philippines. The first Philippine Commission 
recommended, as I have already said, that municipal 
governments should be created in the Philippine Islands 
with powers and functions similar to those enjoyed by 
municipalities in the United States; that the municipal 
authority should be exercised by officers elected by the 
residents of the municipality under the restriction of a 
moderate property or educational qualification; and that 
these municipal authorities should be subject to such 
supervision and control, on the part of American offi- 
cials, as was implied in that idea of " intervention " 
which the Pilipinos regard as a universal and necessary 
axiom of government. These recommendations were 
substantially adopted by President McKinley and em- 
bodied in his instructions to the Taft Commission. The 
latter, accordingly, passed a law of this tenor in Janu- 
ary, 1901, for the organization of municipal govern- 
ments in the Philippines. Under this so-called " mu- 
nicipal code " 765 municipal governments have been 
organized. 

Apart from certain persons who, prior to the capture 
of Manila, had held certain municipal offices, the quali- 

* Report of the Taft Commission, 1901, p. 8. 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 57 

fied electors are persons who own real property to the 
value of $250, or who pay an annual tax of $15, or who 
speak, read, and write English or Spanish. Out of a 
population of 1,000 souls these restrictions yield, on the 
average, not more than nineteen qualified voters. But 
the diffusion of education now in progress, and the 
growth in prosperity which will follow upon the return 
of the insurgent Filipinos to the ways of peace and in- 
dustry, may be expected gradually to enlarge the elec- 
torate. When this latter condition has been realized, 
when peace and industry take the place of fighting and 
brigandage, it will undoubtedly be safe to lower the 
qualifications for voting. 

For my own part, I should like to see the amount of 
property and taxation which now qualify for municipal 
suffrage reduced. And, as acquaintance with a foreign 
language is only one test of knowledge and intelligence, 
and as it is a test which it is unfair to apply to a whole 
race who have little or no need to use foreign languages, 
I trust that some more equitable and adequate educa- 
tional standard may hereafter be devised. Why not a 
successful examination in arithmetic, geography, and 
history — the examination to be conducted in the ver- 
nacular of the native ? How many Americans, I wonder, 
would enjoy the suffrage, if the condition of admittance 
were a reading, writing, and speaking knowledge of 
Spanish, or even of French or German? Why should 
we expect more of the Filipinos, than we ourselves could 
fulfil? And, in any case, is Spanish better for them than 



y 



58 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

Tagalog, or Visayan, or Ilocano, or Yicol, which they 
acquire with their mothers' milk? As to English, which 
will be indispensable for the politicians at Manila and 
the traders there and elsewhere, does any reasonable 
man suppose that the Philippine peoples in general can 
be induced to forget their own vernaculars (which come, 
as it were, by nature) and laboriously and painfully ac- 
quire English which the masses will never have occa- 
sion to employ? Such an illusion defies not only the 
psychology of language, but the lessons of history. 
Why, English experience in Quebec and Spanish ex- 
perience in the Philippines, to go no farther afield, 
should dispel such a fancy. All history teaches that no 
race or people ever abandons its vernacular. 

The municipal officers are subject to supervision on 
the part of the provincial governments. These provin- 
cial governments were organized, pursuant to the Pres- 
ident's instructions to the Taft Commission, which were 
based on the recommendations of the first Philippine 
Commission, under an act passed by the Commission in 
February, 1901. After some changes, thirty-two of 
them are still in full operation. The scheme of organi- 
zation provides for an elective governor — a Filipino — 
and an appointive treasurer and supervisor — Americans 
— who together constitute the governing board of the 
province, along with an appointive prosecuting attorney 
or fiscal and a secretary who have uniformly been Fili- 
pinos. It is the function of this provincial government 
to collect provincial and also municipal taxes; to con- 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 59 

struct highways, bridges, and public buildings; and to 
supervise the officers of the several municipalities in the 
discharge of their duties. As the majority of the gov- 
erning board are Americans, ultimate control is in 
American hands. 

I have already said more than once that, however ob- 
jectionable this plan is to us, it accords with the Philip- 
pine political maxim of " intervention " on the part of 
the sovereign power for the regulation and control of 
the subordinate governmental corporations. This is the 
point, however, at which the education of the Filipinos 
in the use of free institutions and the practice of self- 
government should be taken vigorously in hand. They 
should, by degrees, be trained to the point of assuming 
entire responsibility for their own municipal and provin- 
cial affairs. The machinery of provincial government 
now established, which follows in the main the features 
of the Spanish system to which the Filipinos were 
accustomed, would, by the slight change of making the 
treasurer an elective officer, devolve upon the inhabi- 
tants of the several provinces full control of their munic- 
ipal and provincial governments, while yet retaining 
in the governing board the presence of an American 
supervisor who could give them the benefit of American 
experience and exert a moral influence that might be al- 
most as effective as control. Even if these local govern- 
ments should make mistakes, even if the officials some- 
times squander, or even embezzle, local funds, they must 
eventually be encouraged to take control of their own 



60 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

local affairs, for in no other way can they practise the 
art or form the habit of self-government which it is the 
high mission of the United States to teach them. Not 
power in the government, but liberty and independence 
in the people, is what every genuine republic endeavors 
to secure. 

I am not suggesting that these changes should be 
made immediately. Nor should they be made at any 
time without the concurrence of Governor Taft and his 
colleagues in the administration, or whosoever may then 
represent American authority in the Philippines. But 
I am pointing out the lines along which independent 
self-government may be developed among the Filipinos, 
and must be developed if we are true to the spirit and 
ideals of our own republic. I am by no means, how- 
ever, dissatisfied with the progress already made. There 
is no occasion even for impatience. It is surely a cred- 
itable showing that out of a total population of 
8,000,000 Filipinos, Christian and non-Christian, about 
5,000,000 have already received civil government and 
are now, subject to American inspection and control, 
themselves administering the affairs of their own towns 
and provinces. 

And not only this. Provision has also been made 
for the administration of justice by civil tribunals, in 
which Filipinos are well represented. There is a jus- 
tice's court in each of the 765 municipalities, and all 
these justices of the peace are Filipinos. There is a 
court of first instance in each of the fourteen judicial 



PRESENT SITUATION IN TEE PHILIPPINES 61 

districts into which the archipelago has been divided, 
with one judge to each district, besides two for the court 
of first instance in the city of Manila; and of these six- 
teen judges at least six are Filipinos. And there is a 
supreme court, consisting of a chief justice and six asso- 
ciate justices, sitting in Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu, of 
whom four are Americans and three Filipinos — one of 
them the wise, high-minded, and capable Florentino 
Torres, and another, the chief justice, that model Fili- 
pino, Cayetano S. Arellano, a man of spotless integrity, 
a lawyer of great eminence and renown, and a gentle- 
man of learning, culture, and the most charming refine- 
ment of life and manners. 

I rejoice, too, that the merit system of civil service, 
recommended by the first Commission, has been intro- 
duced into the Philippines. The higb ideal we set 
forth has not been put to shame by practice either in 
"Washington or Manila. There is no more encouraging 
feature about the government of our new dependencies 
than the willingness of politicians to recognize that there 
at least public office is a public trust, and that the com- 
petitive method of ascertaining fitness should be put in 
operation. It has come to be well understood that none 
but the best men available have any chance of securing 
appointment in the Philippines. And the Secretary of 
"War can make the highly creditable statement that 

" !No officer, high or low, has been appointed upon 
any one's request, or upon any personal, social, or polit- 
ical consideration."* 

* Report (1901), p. 62. 



62 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

As the first Commission pointed out, the number of 
offices for which Americans are needed in the Philip- 
pines is really not large. Apart from the directing 
heads of the administrative and judicial systems and the 
supervisors of native officials, there is no place for Amer- 
icans in the civil administration of the islands. " Near- 
ly all the offices/' I wrote, " will, of course, be filled by 
Filipinos themselves."* This declaration has been 
fully confirmed by subsequent practice. And a civil- 
service board, which our Commission recommended, 
provides fair and practical tests for the selection of Fili- 
pinos for office. 

It will be remembered that the prompt establishment 
of a system of free public schools, with the fullest oppor- 
tunity for instruction in English, was urgently recom- 
mended by the first Philippine Commission. Happily 
this policy was incorporated in the instructions given by 
President McKinley to the Taft Commission. And the 
results, short as the interval has been, amply confirm the 
wisdom and beneficence of the policy. About 800 
American teachers are now at work in the Philippines, 
and about 200 more will soon be appointed. Between 
3,000 and 4,000 Filipinos are employed as elementary 
teachers; and of these about 2,000 daily receive at least 
one hour of instruction in English. Not less than 150,- 
000 children are enrolled in the free primary schools. 
The number of native adults receiving English instruc- 
tion in evening schools conducted by American teachers 
* Report. Vol. I., p. 112. 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 63 

was 10,000 in October; but at the rate of increase then 
exhibited, there are probably 20,000, or even 30,000, 
at the present time. There is a wide and enthusiastic 
demand for instruction in English in all parts of the 
archipelago; and next to that is the demand for instruc- 
tion in manual training and the mechanic arts, the lack 
of which has hitherto so greatly retarded the progress of 
agriculture and other industries in the Philippines. It 
is another proof of the intelligence of the Filipinos that 
they so quickly recognize the kind of education they 
most need: applied science for the development of the 
vast natural resources of their islands, and English for 
use in government, and in trade and commerce. 

Though the masses of the Eilipinos are ignorant and 
uneducated, as I have often said, nothing impressed me 
so deeply or bespoke such happy augury for the future 
as the universal thirst for education, the high esteem in 
which knowledge was held by all classes, and the gen- 
eral admiration, deference, and hero-worship every- 
where shown to the native who had been fortunate 
enough to secure an education. There is a general an- 
ticipation of the opening of a new era in which, by the 
aid of schools, the Philippine Islands may advance in the 
steps and emulate the attainments of Japan. Here is 
another lever to lift the Eilipinos to eventual indepen- 
dence. Next to knowledge is the consciousness of igno- 
rance, which stimulates its possessor to strive to learn. 
It is sad to reflect that there are not school-rooms enough 
in the Philippines, or teachers enough for the pupils 



64 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

who desire to be taught. The provision which, under 
Spanish dominion, was made for popular education was 
universally inadequate; but, alas! many of the school- 
houses have disappeared in the havoc wrought by war. 
If the municipalities or the central government of the 
archipelago are to be allowed to incur debts for any pur- 
pose, their first bonds should be issued for school-houses. 
The next, I may add, should be for roads. 

So far no central Philippine government has been 
organized. The scheme recommended by the first Com- 
mission is, with some unimportant modifications, recom- 
mended by the Taft Commission in its recent report. 
To these modifications I see no objection, except that I 
consider the reduction of the membership of the popu- 
lar assembly to thirty a dubious change, especially when 
I recall that this assembly is to represent 6,000,000 or 
7,000,000 people. In New York State, with almost 
the same population, and far more homogeneous, we 
have an Assembly of 150 members and a Senate of 
fifty. The second branch of the Philippine legislature 
need not be numerous, if it is to be appointive; but all 
the more reason for making the popular branch numer- 
ous enough to give adequate representation to all the 
diversified districts and peoples of Luzon and the Vis- 
ay as. I join cordially with the Taft Commission in 
urging Congress to enact a law for the organization of 
the central or general government of the Philippine Isl- 
ands along the lines recommended by both Commis- 
sions. 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 65 

I have described the military situation in the Philip- 
pines, and also the nature and scope of the civil admin- 
istration. Let us next consider the economic condi- 
tions. 

In spite of insurrectionary disturbances, business is 
improving in the Philippines. The imports, not includ- 
ing army supplies, for the fiscal year 1901 amounted to 
$30,200,000, as against $20,600,000 for the fiscal year 
1900; and the exports, $23,200,000, as against $19,- 
700,000. I regret to say that only a small share of 
this trade is with the United States: of the imports, 
$2,800,000, and of the exports, $2,500,000; and though 
the imports from the United States for 1901 show a 
large percentage of increase over those for the year 
1900, the imports from England, France, Germany, and 
the British East Indies have increased in a still greater 
proportion. 

Except in so far as we have maintained peace and 
order in the Philippines, we can make no claim to a 
share in the successful results achieved by the thrift and 
energy of individual Filipinos. Of course without 
tranquillity and without law, business is impossible. 
The improvement of business in the Philippines is at 
least confirmatory evidence of the progress of pacifica- 
tion and effective administration. But our Government 
is fairly chargeable with having left undone nearly 
everything else which a government ought to do for the 
development of trade and commerce in the archipelago. 
In the only Philippine legislation which Congress has 



66 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

yet enacted, not only was no provision made for erecting 
in the Philippines those public agencies and instrumen- 
talities which in the modern world are absolutely essen- 
tial to production, transportation, and exchange, but 
there is a specific injunction against the sale or lease of 
public lands, timber, and mines, and a practical inhibi- 
tion of the granting of franchises. If you throttle bus- 
iness, you need not be astonished at its sluggish and 
meagre life. Under the conditions, the surprising thing 
is that business has so markedly recovered in the Philip- 
pines during the past year. Of course the real explana- 
tion is the abysmal depths of depression to which it had 
sunk during the years of general strife and rapine. A 
big percentage of improvement may really signify only 
a cessation of total paralysis. 

Congress must find time to consider the question of 
economic conditions in the Philippines. With the pub- 
lic lands, forests, and mines all sealed up; with a practi- 
cal prohibition of commercial railroads, street-railways, 
electric light, telephone, and other municipal fran- 
chises; with no right in any municipality, province, or 
island to issue bonds for the purpose of making improve- 
ments in schools, roads, water supply, and other objects 
of prime public importance ; with all the inconvenience, 
losses, and injustice of an unstable currency; with no 
American bank and no power to incorporate legitimate 
business concerns; — surely we may invoke Congress in 
the name of common sense, in the name of justice, in the 
name of humanity, in the name of the unhappy Fili- 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 67 

pinos of whose misery they are the passive abettors, not 
to close the present session without legislation on all 
those subjects which affect so vitally the economic wel- 
fare of the Filipinos, the progress of their industries and 
commerce, and the development of the rich natural re- 
sources of their archipelago. 

In the report of the Secretary of War, in the report 
of the Philippine Commission, in Mr. Conant's special 
report on coinage and banking, you may find all the in- 
formation you are likely to desire on these economic and 
financial problems in the Philippines. Bills will un- 
doubtedly be drafted by experts in the several fields, and 
the special committees of Congress may be trusted to 
thrash them out. The moment is opportune for dispas- 
sionate and scientific legislation on economic and finan- 
cial subjects. I look for wise and statesman-like meas- 
ures. 

Leaving details to the wisdom of Congress — and in 
any event there is no time to discuss them at present — 
I desire to call attention to one feature of the situation 
which, in my judgment, is of vital importance. It does 
not affect those measures which Congress may itself en- 
act, like banking and currency bills; it has reference to 
the exercise of the powers which Congress may grant 
to the Philippine government. The Taft Commission 
has asked that authority be conferred upon it by Con- 
gress to issue bonds; to grant municipal franchises; to 
pass a general public-land law; to make laws and regula- 
tions in regard to mines and forests; to pass a general 



68 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

incorporation law, and to " issue charters to commercial 
railroads, with power to make donations of lands, or 
guarantee the interest on the investments, or both."* 
These objects are all desirable, and some of them indis- 
pensable, to the prosperity of the Filipinos. Whether 
any of them should be handled by Congress directly, I 
shall not venture to discuss. But if they are turned 
over by Congress to the discretion of the Philippine 
Government, I submit that the delegation of power 
should be accompanied by a restriction, which, to my 
way of thinking, is all essential. Let me briefly ex- 
plain. 

The Taft Commission, as I have already said, con- 
curs with the first Philippine Commission in recom- 
mending the establishment of a central government for 
the Philippine Islands in which there shall be a legis- 
lature consisting of an upper house, in which the mem- 
bers (who are to be both Filipinos and Americans) shall 
be partly or wholly appointed by the President of the 
United States, and a lower house, whose members shall 
be elected by the Filipinos themselves. But in recom- 
mending Congress to enact a law for the establishment 
of this central government, they request that it go into 
operation on January 1, 1904. Xow as the several 
grants of power for which the Commission petitions 
Congress, taken collectively, have to do with the weight- 
iest and most far-reaching subjects which for many years 
to come can engage the attention of any government at 
* Report (1901), pp. 149-150. 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 69 

Manila, I submit that these powers, if now delegated by 
Congress, should not be exercised till the Filipinos 
themselves enjoy, through their popular assembly, an 
equal share in the legislative deliberations and an equal 
voice in the legislative decisions. I should, indeed, 
greatly regret the postponement of these beneficent 
economic measures till 1904; but, however grievous the 
delay, it would be infinitely better than to ignore, and, 
by ignoring, to belittle the popular assembly of Fili- 
pinos, who, in 1904, are to become co-ordinate and co- 
equal legislators with the members of the Commission. 
But another solution is at hand. Why not have the 
central government for the archipelago, which the first 
and the second Philippine Commissions agree in recom- 
mending, begin at an earlier date, say in 1902? As to 
the exact time, it might be on July 4th; or, if the Fili- 
pinos prefer, on December 30th, the anniversary of the 
martyrdom of their scholar patriot, Rizal. 

At any rate, I am perfectly clear on the main point. 
Either the powers requested by the Commission should 
not (if granted) be exercised before January 1, 1904, 
when the Filipinos will be represented in a popular as- 
sembly, which is to be an organic part of the govern- 
ment; or if the powers are to be exercised earlier, the 
inauguration of the new government should be moved 
forward to the same date. The Philippines are for the 
Filipinos. We have no right to vote away their public 
property and franchises without their joint consent. If 
Filipinos, as legislators and administrators, are to join 



70 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

us in the government of the archipelago, why should the 
weightiest and most important business be disposed of 
before their admittance? And if we are to train them 
up in the ways of self-government, where shall we find 
more stimulating and more sobering tasks to set them 
for their first lessons? 

There is still another reason why Americans should 
have the co-operation of Philippine legislators and ad- 
ministrators in dealing with Philippine public property 
and franchises. They would in this way avail them- 
selves of popular sentiment, of local knowledge and cir- 
cumstances which it is impossible for Americans other- 
wise to ascertain. Take, for example, the subject of 
railroads. The Commission recommends the construc- 
tion of 1,000 miles in Luzon, and probably 500 in Min- 
danao. Yet, in that connection, they state, very truly, 
that " the island of Mindanao, with an area of some- 
thing more than 36,000 square miles, except along its 
littoral, is practically terra incognita. " * Now, the 
Christian Filipinos who live on the sea-coast are likely 
to know more of the conditions which prevail among the 
Mohammedan and heathen tribes in the vast interior 
than anybody else. They, with the Jesuit missionaries, 
must instruct the Philippine government in regard to 
that " practically terra incognita." But until they have 
been heard, until the subject has been thoroughly 
discussed by Filipinos in their popular assembly, who 
can tell whether 500 miles of railway in Mindanao 

* P. 62. 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 71 

would pay operating expenses in the next five or fifty 
years? 

Nor can the American authorities afford to neglect 
the wisdom and the sentiment of the duly elected repre- 
sentatives of the Filipinos in fields better known than 
Mindanao. The Commission recommends 1,000 miles 
of railway for the island of Luzon, which at present has 
one railway about 100 miles in length extending north- 
ward from Manila to Dagupan. Now, in the great mul- 
tiplication of railways contemplated by the Commission, 
there is a line from Dagupan on the coast to Benguet in 
the mountains, which, though only fifty-five miles in 
length, will, of necessity, be very difficult and expensive 
to construct. Are there any communities of Filipinos 
who desire this railroad ? So far as appears, it is for the 
sole benefit of Americans. This road would afford con- 
venient access " to the highlands of Benguet, in which," 
says the Commission, " it is hoped and believed ultimate- 
ly the sanitarium of the Philippines will be located."* 
Sanitarium, for whom? Of course for American offi- 
cials who find the climate of Manila and other Phil- 
ippine towns oppressive and intolerable for certain 
portions of the year. And as a railroad cannot be con- 
structed in a day, the Commission has already started a 
highway. " The only road," according to the report, 
" which has been put in course of construction under the 
immediate direction of the Commission is that extend- 
ing from the town of Pozorubio to the town of Baguio, 

* Report (1901), p. 72. 



72 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

in the province of Benguet." * Now, a sanitarium for 
American officials in the mountains of Benguet is a very 
desirable object; if their stay is to be prolonged in the 
Philippines, such a sanitarium might even be described 
as a hygienic necessity. And, in that case, who can 
doubt the expediency of railway extension to Benguet? 
But, when all that is conceded — and I concede it fully 
— I hold that American authorities have no right to 
vote Philippine money or credit for this object with- 
out the consent of the representatives of the Philippine 
people. 

So far, I have said nothing of the Philippine tariff or 
of American duties on Philippine merchandise imported 
into the United States. The latter is likely to receive 
a good deal of attention from Congress and the Ameri- 
can people within the next few months, or even weeks. 
The former, to judge from the reports of the Secretary 
of War and the Philippine Commission, has been satis- 
factorily disposed of; though I think that there should 
be some official assurance that our open-door policy in 
the Orient has been maintained in spirit as well as in 
letter by the new tariff bill which went into operation 
in the Philippines on November 15th. I should like 
to be officially assured that all nations have been treated 
alike in the trade and commerce of the Philippines, as 
we insist they shall be in the trade and commerce of 
China; that no schedules have been lowered for the ad- 
vantage of the United States or raised to the detriment 
* Report (1901), p. 72. 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 73 

of other nations; and that the welfare of the Filipinos 
alone has dictated the terms of the tariff, and that it 
grants absolutely equal trading privileges to all the na- 
tions of the world. 

Since the recent decision of the Supreme Court, it 
has become necessary for Congress to pass a law fixing 
the duties on merchandise coming from the Philippine 
Islands into the United States. The bill which has al- 
ready passed the House of Representatives levies our 
Dingley rates upon these imports. In that respect it 
treats the Philippine Islands like the rest of the world. 
But this severe justice is also tempered with charity; 
for the bill provides that all duties collected in the 
United States on imports from the Philippine Islands 
shall be turned over to the Philippine treasury for the 
benefit of the government of the archipelago. Some of 
you will recall that when, two years ago, it was first 
proposed by Congress to apply the Dingley rates to mer- 
chandise imported from Porto Rico, I publicly 'criticised 
the measure, on the ground that it violated the promise 
of free trade which the commanding-general made to 
Porto Rico, when it not only surrendered, but welcomed 
the American troops to its shores. And you will also 
recall that in a speech on Cuban affairs which I deliv- 
ered here, after returning from a visit to the island last 
spring, I advocated, on high grounds of policy and hu- 
manity, the reduction of the Dingley rates on Cuban 
sugar and tobacco coming to the United States. If 
Cuba is, as I devoutly hope, to enjoy freer trade with the 



74 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

United States, if Porto Rican exports now enter our 
markets absolutely free of duty, surely we shall not 
deny to our impoverished wards in the Orient that re- 
duction of at least fifty per cent, of the Dingley rates on 
Philippine tobacco, hemp, sugar, and other merchandise 
coming to the United States which the Philippine Com- 
mission so wisely recommend in their report. 

Such a concession is at once in the interest of the 
United States and in the interest of the Philippine Isl- 
ands. The latter is self-evident. The former may not 
be so obvious; yet I hold it equally certain. For what 
are the means by which sovereign nations retain power 
over their dependencies? First of all, and most potent 
of all, there is sentiment. But sentiment presupposes 
community of race, language, religion, law, political and 
social institutions. The cementing force of sentiment 
you see in the connection between Australia and Great 
Britain. It can never operate to bind the Philippine 
Islands to the United States: nature and the course of 
human history have otherwise ordained; the different 
color of our skins, the different speech of our tongues, 
the different life we live absolutely forbid. But there 
is another means of retaining a dependency. This is 
the primitive method of physical force. It is by phys- 
ical force — and physical force alone — that Germany re- 
tains her holdings in East Africa, Prance in Tonkin, 
and England in India. But this method is abhorrent to 
American sentiment, repugnant to American ideals, and 
at utter variance with American practice. Our people 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 75 

would not consider such a policy for a moment; and they 
have effectually restrained their Government from rais- 
ing armies to carry it out. Even the temporary neces- 
sity of holding and governing the Philippines by force 
is painful to the great majority of our people, and they 
tolerate it, I believe, only because they see no alterna- 
tive, and somehow trust that freedom shall be the happy 
end of force. For a sovereign nation so embarrassed at 
the disparity between the policy it carries out and the 
ideals it cherishes there is a third method of retaining 
dependencies of quite peculiar value. Appeal to the 
self-interest of your wards and make their connection 
with you profitable. In this way England won the 
Scottish Highlanders and the French Canadians, though 
counteracting causes denied her success in dealing with 
the Celtic Catholics of Ireland and the Dutch Puritans 
of South Africa. In this way, if at all, we are to win 
the confidence and gratitude (perhaps affection is too 
much ever to expect) of the natives of the Philippine 
Islands. They must see and feel that their connection 
with the United States is advantageous to them. This 
appeal to their self-interest might even beget a kind of 
sentiment in our favor. But let there be no misunder- 
standing as to the terms of this policy. The Filipinos 
will never thank you for good roads, or railways, or 
schools, or courts of justice, or representative institu- 
tions, or an honest and effective administration of their 
affairs. These they will, when they get accustomed to 
them, take as a matter of course; it is they who pay for 



76 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

them; and, if they have any comment to make, it mil 
be that American officials in the Philippines are well 
paid for all the services they render; and the thought, 
though, perhaps, unexpressed, will visit their minds, that 
Filipinos themselves might govern the Philippines as 
well as Americans. Something else is necessary to ap- 
peal to their sense of profit and advantage. That some- 
thing is a great, manifest, and ever-continuing act of 
generosity on the part of the United States. The aboli- 
tion or sweeping reduction of our customs duties on the 
products of Philippine labor and skill would be just such 
a measure. No other field of generosity half so promis- 
ing is open to us. Such a concession, though meaning 
little to us, would mean everything to the Filipinos. 
May Congress have wisdom to utilize this unique and 
fruitful opportunity! 

Let us now dismiss the economic aspect of Philippine 
affairs and turn to the ecclesiastical. Under the domin- 
ion of Spain the Catholic Church was established in the 
Philippines and received its share of the annual reve- 
nues. Taking the normal times preceding the outbreak 
of the rebellion, we find in the budget of 1894-95 that 
out of a total Philippine revenue of somewhat over $13,- 
000,000 (silver), the expenditure on the Church ag- 
gregated $1,227,000, of which something more than 
half was devoted to the salaries of the parochial clergy. 
One of the first acts of the American authorities was to 
separate the Church from the State, and to stop the 
grant of public moneys to it. That done, it might have 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 77 

been supposed that no religious problem would remain 
to vex the Philippine government. The disestablished 
Catholic Church might, indeed, find difficulty in provid- 
ing for the cure of the 6,500,000 Catholic souls enu- 
merated in the church registry] but somehow undoubt- 
edly that potent and venerable, yet ever fresh and active 
organization would accomplish the arduous task. 

What made trouble for the government was the 
question of the friars. As a class, they had long been 
obnoxious to the people of the Philippines; and every 
revolutionary movement, since the insurrection in the 
'70's, in the province of Cavite, had been animated by 
hatred of the friars, and aimed at their expulsion from 
the islands and the confiscation of their property. The 
causes of this antipathy may be read in Rizal's great 
novel, Noli me tangere, which Mr. P. E. Gannett has 
translated into English under the title of Friars and 
Filipinos. I say nothing of the charge of immorality, 
which, in all probability, has been much exaggerated. 
It was rather, I believe, as victims of institutions that 
the friars acquired the hostility of the natives. They 
were not only Spanish, but they were the real admin- 
istrators of the Spanish government in the archipelago; 
and the Filipinos charged them with the injustice, 
cruelty, and oppression in which that government is- 
sued. And, as though this were not burden enough to 
carry, three of the religious corporations — the Domini- 
cans, the Augustinians, and the Recolletos — having ac- 
quired large estates in the islands, suffered attack as un- 



78 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

just and oppressive landlords. The total area owned by 
the three orders amounts to 403,000 acres; and it throws 
much light on Tagalog activity in recent insurrections 
that nearly three-fourths of these holdings are in the 
Tagalog provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Manila, Bulacan, 
Morong, and Bataan, while not less than 121,000 acres 
are in the Tagalog province of Cavite, which has always 
been a hot-bed of rebellion. 

The lands of the religious orders were confiscated by 
the constitution of the Philippine Republic, which was 
adopted in January, 1899. Already the revolutionists 
of 1896 and 1898 had driven from the parishes all the 
members of the Dominican, Augustinian, Recolletan, 
and Franciscan orders who acted as priests; and four- 
fifths of the 746 regular parishes in the archipelago 
were held by members of these orders. The unhappy 
monks suffered imprisonment and death at the hands 
of the insurgents; they fell a prey to mortality; they 
escaped to foreign lands or returned to Spain; so that 
of the 1,124 who were in the islands in 1896, the ma- 
jority had disappeared, and only 472 remained at the 
close of the year 1900. 

Under the constitution and laws of the United States, 
these expelled friars were free to return to their par- 
ishes, if the Catholic Church so decreed. And under 
the treaty of Paris, which protected all property rights, 
the lands which the Malolos constitutional convention 
confiscated, were once more safely vested in the Domin- 
icans, Recolletos, and Franciscans. This was a bitter 



PRESENT SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 79 

pill for the Filipinos, who had taken up arms and shed 
their blood primarily with the object of expelling the 
friars and confiscating their property. The treaty of 
Paris balked them of the dearest object of their rebel- 
lion ! 

Of course the United States is blamed by Filipinos 
for permitting this defeat of the insurrectionary pro- 
gramme. But Church being divorced from State, it is 
not for us to dictate what kind of priests the Catholic 
Church shall send to its parishes in the Philippines. We 
may wish that the Spanish monks were elsewhere, and 
that American priests held their places in all those Phil- 
ippine parishes. But, of course, officially the United 
States is powerless. In the matter of the property of 
the religious orders, however, the conditions are entirely 
different. And if that question is settled wisely and 
justly, I believe it will dispose of the other also ; for what 
motive could the Catholic Church have in forcing Span- 
ish monks on unwilling Philippine parishes when the 
property ties which now bind them to the archipelago 
have been equitably dissolved? 

What, then, should be done with the agricultural 
holdings and other property of the religious orders? 
The government should buy them at a reasonable 
price and sell them to individual Filipinos. I have ad- 
vocated this policy in season and out of season ever since 
my return from the Philippines in the fall of 1899. I 
have argued that the government would lose no money 
by this purchase and sale; and, even if it did, that the 



80 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

settlement of so embarrassing a question was worth all 
the sacrifice that the most pessimistic critics could see in 
this method of adjustment. I have asserted that this is 
the only just and statesman-like policy. We do not want 
to deprive the religious orders of any property to which 
they hold a valid title ; under the terms of the treaty of 
Paris, we could not if we would. But they have at 
least as much interest in selling as we have in buying. 
For the discontent of the Filipinos which we wish to 
allay, the disappointment which we aim to solace, are 
expressions of that same mental attitude which led to 
expulsion and persecution of the friars and confiscation 
of their property. The friars can never again be happy 
or prosperous in their estates; the Filipinos will never 
be contented so long as they hold them. Common sense 
and justice alike prescribe the course to be adopted: 
purchase by the government and sale in small holdings 
preferably to the present tenants. 

In November, 1899, I first suggested this policy in 
the Outlook* and, as I have said, I have been proclaim- 
ing it by pen and voice with a good deal of insistency 
ever since. I was glad to find it recommended by the 
Secretary of War and the Taft Commission in their re- 
cent reports. Congress should enact it into law with- 
out further delay. Unhappily, there has been too much 
delay already. 

* See November 18, 1889, p. 669. 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 81 



THE FUTUKE OF THE PHILIPPINES. 

I now address myself to the most momentous question 
that can be raised in connection with the Philippines. 
It might well form the subject, not of a single address 
merely, but of a volume; so that I can only touch on its 
leading features in the remainder of the time — now far 
spent and already, I fear, too long — which your gener- 
ous patience and close attention embolden me to-day to 
devote to the consideration of Philippine affairs. I al- 
lude, of course, to our future Philippine policy and the 
ultimate destination of the Philippines. This is a seri- 
ous question, if ever there was one. It is, however, too 
large to discuss with brevity; yet, to omit it altogether 
would leave my survey of Philippine affairs a blank at 
the most vital point. I am well aware, however, of the 
difficulty of the problem, and feel the presumption of 
offering a solution; yet it is the duty of all good citizens 
to advise the public in matters of national concern which 
they have made a business of investigating, and as re- 
gards Philippine affairs, I am determined that whatever 
other criticism may be made upon me, I shall not be 
found wanting in either candor or courage. It seems 
to me that the highest act open to constructive states- 
manship in America to-day is to conceive and formulate 
a wise Philippine policy — a policy which shall be true 
to the principles of our republic, accordant with the 
facts of the situation, definitive and permanent in its 



82 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

character, and, therefore, fitted to shape and color all 
legislation requisite for its own gradual realization. 
The day of ignorant and enthusiastic ranting on the one 
hand and on the other of inertia and drift, of uncertain 
courses, of temporary expedients has gone by. The time 

. approaches to set our Philippine compass by the fixed 
- stars. 

f~ I take as my starting point the motives and objects 
with which we went into the Philippines. They were 
impressively voiced by President McKinley, and I have 
already told you how he set them forth to me three years 
ago. Our purpose was not selfish, it was humanitarian ; 
it was not the vanity of self-aggrandizement, it was not 
the greed of power and dominion; no, no, not these, but 
altruism caring for the happiness of others, philanthropy 
relieving the Pilipinos of oppression and conferring on 
them the blessings of liberty. This was the supreme 
consideration with President McKinley. It was this 
that touched the vein of sentiment in the American 

\ hearts that so overwhelmingly supported him. It does 
not matter what judgment you may, in the cooler atmos- 
phere of 1902, pass upon that popular sentiment of the 
summer of 1898. You may consider it extravagant, 
irrational, impractical. I thought at the time that it 
went too far; and I publicly pointed out that while, 
under the Monroe Doctrine, it might become our duty 
to relieve American peoples from European oppression, 
we had no call to go into the business of rectifying the 
tyrannies of Asia. But the popular heart was stirred 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 83 

too deeply to be stilled, and Admiral Dewey's great vic- 
tory in Manila Bay had brought the Filipinos within the 
range of American solicitude and sympathy. -J 

This is the first fact in the history of our relations 
with the Philippines. The political emancipation of the 
Filipinos was the controlling object with the President 
and people of the United States. I am, of course, aware - 
that other and less worthy aims appealed to individual 
Americans and to groups of Americans. / It would be 
strange if it were otherwise, considering how diversified 
human motives are apt to be. The jingo saw in the an- 
nexation of the Philippines another avenue for spread- 
eagleism; to Americans in the Orient it meant an acces- 
sion of American influence in Asia; to the Protestant 
churchman it offered a new field for missionary enter- 
prise; the exploiting capitalist was fascinated by the 
riches of Philippine forests, lands, and mines, which 
showed like " the wealth of Ormus or of Ind " ; and the 
sensational press, still delirious from the fever of war 
and surfeited with the staleness of piping peace, dis- 
cerned in the Philippines material for new sensations 
which promised to be as stirring as the excitant was re- 
mote, unknown, and dangerously explosive. All these 
influences, and others, were undoubtedly at work. Yet 
it was not these forces singly or in combination that 
carried the day; it was the humanitarian object of lib- 
erating the Filipinos from Spanish tyranny and bestow- 
ing upon them the boon of freedom that decided the 
President and people of the United States to compel 



84 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

Spain to cede to us her sovereignty over the Philippine 
Islands. /' 

Fortunate, indeed, that no lower motive prevailed. 
Any other object than the humanitarian one of carrying 
the gift of freedom to the Filipinos would have ended 
in vast and bitter disappointment, or, perhaps, even in 
poignant remorse. Did we need the Philippines to 
make our power felt in Asia ? No, for we can exert the 
most potent national influence in all quarters of the 
world without owning adjacent territory, as our recent 
experiences in Pekin and Panama have demonstrated to 
the satisfaction of the most incredulous. And had we 
gone into the Philippines for commercial gain, when, 
think you, would our traders' profits have amounted to 
the hundreds of millions of dollars which the archipelago 
has already cost us? And what shall I say of the thou- 
sands of brave and generous young Americans who have 
lost their lives in the Philippines ? ~No prospect of profit 
however assured, no wealth or advantage however colos- 
sal, could ever atone for the precious American life- 
blood swallowed up by the hungry soil of Luzon and the 
Visayas. For such a sacrifice there is only one justifi- 
cation. It is the discharge of duty, service in a right- 
eous cause. If our presence in the Philippines be not 
justified in its purpose and intent, then our soldiers' 
blood is on our hands ; ay, and all the blood, in that case 
innocent, of the Filipinos we have fought, the misery 
we have caused their families, and the devastation we 
have wrought in their homes. 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 85 

This awful responsibility we cannot escape either be- 
fore our own consciences or at the bar of history un- 
less we have done what we have done in the Philippines 
for the sake of redeeming the Filipinos from foreign op- 
pression, saving them from domestic anarchy, and lead- 
ing them into the ways of self-government and freedom 
— a blessing at once unmeasured and immeasurable. 
But I assert that to confer this blessing was the final 
cause of our acceptance from Spain of sovereignty over 
the Philippines. Nothing has happened since to alter 
our purpose. Indeed, all subsequent occurrences have 
gone to confirm the wisdom and transcendent nobility 
of this end and to exhibit the folly and delusion of any 
other end. Self-seeking ends of every sort are excluded 
by American policy and stultified by actual conditions 
in the Philippines. We are in the Philippines for the 
sake of the Filipinos; but while American sovereignty 
is to the Filipinos a great boon, to us this extension of 
sovereignty is not advantageous, but burdensome. Yet 
we shall carry the burden till they are able to relieve 
us, never forgetting the goal, and never renouncing the 
humanitarian spirit which inspired our entrance upon 
so difficult a task. On this fundamental point Presi- 
dent Roosevelt is not less explicit than President Mc- 
Kinley. Listen to the noble and memorable words 
with which he met his first Congress: 

" We are extremely anxious that the natives [Fili- 
pinos] shall share the power of governing themselves. 
We are anxious, first, for their sakes, and next, because 



86 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

it relieves us of a great burden. There need not be the 
slightest fear of our not continuing to give them all the 
liberty for which they are fit. . . . We do not de- 
■ sire to do for the islanders merely what has elsewhere 
been done for tropic peoples by even the best foreign 
governments. We hope to do for them what has never 
before been done for any people of the tropics — to make 
them fit for self-government after the fashion of the 
really free nations." * 

What does this mean but that the Filipinos are to be 
taught to govern themselves as Americans or English- 
men govern themselves? And is it necessary to observe 
that progressive liberty must, from the nature of the 
. case, issue in sovereign independence, " after the fashion 
of the really free nations/' if, indeed, the Filipinos de- 
sire that boon when they have reached the stage of po- 
litical enfranchisement qualifying them to assume it? 
President Roosevelt does not use these terms; but the 
goal is inevitable if you set no limit to the progressive 
development of liberty and self-government. 

I make this implication explicit because, though the 

goal may be distant, I think it desirable to form a clear 

notion of what it really is. I say that, as it would be 

inconsistent with our humanitarian Philippine policy to 

keep the Filipinos in perpetual dependence, and as we 

are to grant them an ever-increasing measure of liberty 

and home rule, they are likely one day to become a free 

and sovereign people like ourselves. And I say that 

* Message of the President of the United States, Fifty-Seventh Con- 
gress, First Session, 1901. 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 87 

consummation is infinitely to be preferred to their in- 
corporation into the United States of America as a State, 
or even as a territory. / 1 wish the Federal Constitution 
might be amended so as to provide for the perpetual 
exclusion of Asiatic countries from partnership in our 
great American Republic. But, whether the constitu- 
tion be amended or left intact, I am sure it is the policy 
of the American people to admit no Asiatic country to 
the status and privileges of a State or territory in this 
Republic of the United States of America. Consequent- 
ly that independence which is the final term of progres- 
sive liberty for the Filipinos, since it cannot realize it- 
self by incorporation in our union of American States, 
must, perforce, when the hour arrives, find embodiment 
in a separate and self-contained national organization. 
/Thus, if you look beyond the present and the near 
/ future, you descry in the distance an independent 
* — and sovereign Philippine Republic. The watchword of 
progress, the key to the future of the political develop- 
ment of the archipelago, is neither colonialism nor feder- 
alism, but nationalism. The destiny of the Philippine 
Islands is not to be a State or territory in the United 
States of America, but a daughter republic of ours — a 
new birth of liberty on the other side of the Pacific, 
which shall animate and energize those lovely islands of 
the tropical seas, and, rearing its head aloft, stand as a 
monument of progress and a beacon of hope to all the 

L oppressed and benighted millions of the Asiatic conti- 
nent. 



88 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

I say you will never consent to make the Philippine 
Islands an integral and organic part of the United States 
of America. ~No political party will ever propose so 
insane a programme; no statesman will ever venture to 

. advocate a policy so repugnant to American sentiment. 
The case needs no arguing. The objections to the plan 
are insuperable; the reasons against it invincible; the 
hostility to it ingrained and ineradicable. The grounds 
of this antipathetic attitude are fundamental and all- 
embracing; they are physical, physiological, ethnologi- 
cal, historical, psychological, social, and political. Every 
aspect of human existence enters its protest against a 
union so unnatural and so unwise. 

Very well; what then? A colony, a dependency? 
For a time, this status may suffice; as a permanent ar- 

i rangement, it is impossible. For you propose to dower 
the Filipinos with an ever-increasing measure of lib- 
erty; but liberty grows by what it feeds on, and moves 
rapidly to its goal, which is independence. Then, too, 
the Filipinos have condensed the experience of centuries 
into these last half dozen years. They have dreamed of 
liberty; they have fought for liberty; they have seen in 
the east the star of independence. These are facts as 
potent as any other — and deeper than most — in the life 
of nations. The true historian recognizes them and ap- 
praises them at their just value. Listen to the language 
of the historian of the English people: 

" I begin to see that there may be a truer wisdom in 
the c humanitarianism ' of Gladstone than in the purely 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 89 

political view of Disraeli. The sympathy of peoples 
with peoples, the sense of a common humanity between 
nations, the aspirations of nationalities after freedom 
and independence, are real political forces ; and it is just 
because Gladstone owns them as forces, and Disraeli dis- 
owns them, that the one has been on the right side and 
the other on the wrong in parallel questions such as the 
upbuilding of Germany and Italy. I think it will be so 
in this upbuilding of the Sclave."* 

These words were uttered in 1877, when Tory Eng- 
land was opposing the legitimate aspirations of the 
Sclaves and of Russia. But here, too, as formerly, in 
the matter of the German and Italian nationalities, time 
has shown that the humanitarian Gladstone was right 
and his opponents wrong. As Lord Salisbury, speaking 
for his party, not long ago, cynically confessed, " we put 
our money on the wrong horse." Sympathy with the 
legitimate self-assertion of other races and peoples and 
with aspirations after freedom and nationality gave 
Gladstone a political insight which the more selfish and 
worldly-wise politicians of his day never attained to. 
And what a tragic vindication his treatment of the 
Boers has received by the long-continued, mutually ex- 
hausting, and desolating struggle in South Africa with 
its assured nemesis of distrust, hatred, and racial antip- 
athy! Gladstone saw that struggling nationalities are 
the jewels of history, the hope and promise of the world. 

The American people have always sympathized with 
" the aspirations of nationalities after freedom and inde- 
* Letters of John Richard Green (1901), p. 447. 



90 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

pendence." And when representative institutions have 
been conferred upon the Filipinos, if the people, 
through their regularly constituted spokesmen — which 
Luna, Malvar, and Lukban never were — petition for 
freedom and independence and show that they are capa- 
ble of maintaining law and order and discharging their 
international obligations, can it be doubted that the 
American people would grant such a petition? The 
United States would deal as liberally with the Philip- 
pines as Great Britain with her colonies; and everybody 
knows that if the self-governing commonwealths of Aus- 
tralia and Canada to-day desired independence, they 
might have it for the asking. The mistake of Agui- 
naldo and the insurgents (so far as the insurgents were 
not mere brigands and robbers) was in approaching the 
United States with rifles instead of petitions. 

From the American point of view, then, ever-increas- 
ing liberty and self-government is to be our policy tow- 
ard the Filipinos; and it is the nature of such continu- 
ously expanding liberty to issue in independence. This, 
then, is our programme for the future, both near and 
remote. And I believe that while the great heart of the 
American people rejoices at the privilege of granting 
progressive liberties to the Filipinos, it throbs with still 
keener delight at the prospect of a day when the process 
shall be completed by the grant of a perfect indepen- 
dence. This, I say, is the necessary outcome of our 
L policy toward the Filipinos. From the American point 
of view, Philippine independence is inevitable. And, 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 91 

from the American point of view, Philippine indepen- 
dence is a consummation devoutly to be wished. Let us 
now see toward what goal the conditions and aspirations 
of the Filipinos themselves point. 

In endeavoring to describe the attitude of the Fili- 
pinos to the question in hand, there is danger of permit- 
ting fancy or prejudice to take the place of scientific in- 
vestigation and impartial statement. If I have erred 
in representing the sentiment of Americans on the Phil- 
ippine question — I do not think I have, but I say if I 
have — my fellow-citizens are here to correct and criti- 
cise me. But who shall answer me if I misrepresent the 
far-ofT, silent Filipinos? All the more reason, therefore, 
for care, for accuracy, for impartiality, and for sym- 
pathy. I know that I have not myself escaped the ac- 
cusation — by partisan journals, happily — of misreport- 
ing some things in the Philippines. One expects that 
from the bigots who, in the solitude of their own rooms, 
create Philippine facts to buttress their own political 
fabrics. But I notice that in the Philippines my re- 
ports and statements have been very differently received. 
For three years past I have had the satisfaction of see- 
ing that the Filipinos feel they have been sympatheti- 
cally apprehended and correctly reported by me. And 
only the other day I read in a Manila newspaper that 
of all the Americans who had gone to the Philippines, 
I was one of a small company — only three others were 
mentioned — " who had most readily succeeded in ascer- 
taining, assimilating, and proclaiming, the opinion of 



92 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

the Filipinos (que mas pronto han logrado identificarse 
con la opinion filipina)."* 

I have already said enough of the heterogeneity of 
Philippine conditions to render it unnecessary to explain 
that no single off-hand formula can exhaustively answer 
any question relative to the inhabitants of the Philip- 
pines. And in considering the ultimate destiny of the 
archipelago, in endeavoring to formulate a definitive 
Philippine policy for the guidance of the government 
and people of the United States, we must first eliminate 
the Mohammedan and heathen tribes of Mindanao, 
Basilan, Sulu, Palawan, and the smaller islands ad- 
jacent to them. Our hold on these peoples is very 
slight; of the interior of their islands we know nothing; 
our jurisdiction is confined to their waters and to a few 
points on their long coast lines where friendly chief- 
tains have agreed to accept American suzerainty. Po- 
tentially these islands are ours; actually our jurisdic- 
tion is almost nominal. 

Now, the few sultans and datos we have won over 
cannot, I suppose, be credited with much devotion to the 
American flag. And the sultans and datos of the in- 
numerable tribes in the interior of those southern islands 
know nothing of us. Whatever policy, therefore, may 
be adopted by the American people as a final solution 
of the Philippine question, the wishes of the Moham- 
medan and heathen tribes are not likely to be an impor- 
tant factor. Of course we should not ignore their 

* La Democracies, Manila, October 14, 1901. 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 93 

wishes. But few of them will have anything to say to 
us. Yet the demand which their situation makes upon 
the holder of sovereignty over the Philippine archi- 
pelago will have to receive very serious consideration. 
For example, these tribes would, in all probability, not 
be so quiet under an independent Philippine Republic, 
were one ever established, as they are under American 
sovereignty. 'Now, they are indifferent and passive; but 
they might easily become, what they have been in the 
past, aggressive, troublesome, bellicose, murderous. 
From what I heard from and about the Sultan of Sulu, 
I judge that, if American jurisdiction over the Phil- 
ippines were ever to cease, he would, if he were per- 
mitted to do so, ask for a British protectorate, as his 
brother sultans did in the Malay States; for having 
visited Singapore, he has learned their history and heard 
of their prosperity. And where the Sulu Archipelago 
goes, the kindred people of Palawan are likely to go 
also. Whether there are enough Christian Filipinos on 
the coast of Mindanao to control its future is a ques- 
tion; but, geographically and historically, that island, 
which was the first on which Magellan landed, is 
closely connected with the Christianized islands of 
Luzon and the Yisayas; and the Jesuits, with rare de- 
votion and self-sacrifice, have here and there carried 
Christianity and civilization into the benighted interior. 
I need not pursue this subject further. I have said 
enough to show that if, with that progressive enlarge- 
ment of the liberties of the Christian Filipinos which 



■' 



94: PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

it is the policy of the United States to confer, they 
should ever attain the goal of sovereign independence, 
the new Philippine Republic would find itself confront- 
ed with a serious, though, perhaps, not insoluble prob- 
lem in the settlement and maintenance of the status of 
the Mohammedan and heathen tribes of the great south- 
ern islands of the archipelago. I turn from these to 
Luzon and the Yisayas, with the smaller adjacent isl- 
ands, all of which are inhabited, with slight exceptions, 
by Christian Filipinos. It is these people who will de- 
cide the ultimate destiny of the Philippine Islands — 
these and the people of the United States, whose senti- 
ments I have already endeavored to analyze and ex- 
hibit. What do the people of Luzon and the Yisayas 
desire of the American people? What kind of govern- 
ment do they wish eventually for themselves? 

I will answer these questions by quoting two passages 
which I wrote on that subject in the report of the first 
Philippine Commission. The first is this: 

" There being no Philippine nation, but only a col- 
lection of different peoples, there is no general public 
opinion in the archipelago; but the men of property and 
education, who alone interest themselves in public af- 
fairs, in general recognize as indispensable American 
authority, guidance, and protection."* 

It is, of course, possible to exaggerate the diversities 
of the Christian population of Luzon and the Yisayas. 
It is true that the vernacular of the Tagalog is not intel- 

* Report, p. 121. 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 95 

ligible to a Yisayan and vice versa, and that the same 
is true of Vicols, Ilocanos, etc., but it must be remem- 
bered that in every town of the archipelago there are 
some educated men who speak Spanish, although the 
number in remoter places may be very small. Of 
course, of this class you may predicate a public opinion. 
And since 1899 it is possible that war, which is a great 
unifier, even of disparate communities, when they have 
a common enemy, has brought not only in every com- 
munity the educated classes and the ignorant masses 
into a closer union, but also the different peoples them- 
selves — Tagalogs, Yisayans, Ilocanos, etc. — into rela- 
tions of co-operation and sympathy, thus deepening, by 
universal contrast with the white man, the consciousness 
of community of race, and, perhaps, also developing the 
latent sentiment of nationality. In 1899, however, the 
masses of the people seemed to me indifferent to the out- 
come of the contest between the Tagalog insurgents we 
were then fighting and the forces of the United States. 
As one of them said to me in Cebu, they didn't care so 
long as they had their rice and their fish. ^^ 

The second passage I have already quoted. Written | 
in 1899, it has been verified by all that has since hap- 
pened in the Philippines; and, as it is the quintessence 
of the political aspirations of the Filipinos, it should be 
the animating principle of our definitive and ultimate 
Philippine policy. Here it is once more: 

" The Philippine Islands, even the most patriotic de- 
clare, cannot, at the present time, stand alone. They 



06 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

I need the tutelage and protection of the United States. 
But they need it, in order that, in due time, they may, 
in their opinion, become self-governing and indepen- 
dent. For it would be a misrepresentation of facts not 
to report that ultimate independence — independence 
after an undefined period of American training — is the 
aspiration and goal of the intelligent Filipinos who to- 
day so strenuously oppose the suggestion of indepen- 
dence at the present time."* 

I believe, as I have said, that this is the essence of 
the political aspiration and opinion of intelligent Fili- 
pinos ; and, as intelligent Filipinos exercise a remarkable 
influence over the ignorant masses of the people, this is, 
or will become — if, under the quickening agency of war, 
it has not already become — the political programme of 
all the Christian Filipinos of Luzon, the Yisayas, and 
the coast of Mindanao; that is, of all Filipinos except 
the Mohammedan and heathen tribes, whose political 
situation we have already discussed. That their ulti- 
mate goal is independence there is no manner of doubt. 
Practically all Christian Filipinos are agreed on that 
point. But as regards an interval of American tutelage 
and training, it seems to me that a difference of opinion 
begins to emerge. As I read the Philippine newspapers 
— and I take a Manila daily — I perceive that while all 
recognize American tutelage as unavoidable, not all ac- 
knowledge it as good and desirable in itself, though the 
majority, I should guess, still consider it indispensable 
for a time. 

* Report, p. 83. 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 97 

Here, then, is the criterion for determining the course 
of politics among the Filipinos. All of them, I repeat, 
desire independence eventually. But the process of po- 
litical enfranchisement may be immediate, or at least 
very rapid, or it may be gradual, progressive, and of 
long duration. Each course will undoubtedly have its 
advocates; but as all Filipinos favor eventual indepen- 
dence, the majority, it may be predicted with safety, will 
embrace the policy which leads most quickly and surely 
to that goal. Timid men, interested men, conservative 
men, old men, without renouncing the goal of indepen- 
dence, will in the meantime prefer to endure the ills of 
dependence on the United States rather than to fly to 
the unknown ills of independence. These Filipinos will 
constitute the opportunist party. And opposed to them 
will stand the great majority of Filipinos who will agi- 
tate for immediate independence, and they will be enti- 
tled to call themselves the nationalist party. Such is 
the coming political alignment of Filipinos in Luzon 
and the Visayas, as I foresee it. All of them in favor 
of an independent and sovereign Philippine Republic 
as the final consummation of their ideals and aspirations ; 
but in the meanwhile a small but influential opportunist 
party content with temporary dependence on the United 
States and a numerous nationalist party clamoring for 
immediate independence. I shall be greatly disappoint- 
ed if within the next decade these tropical islands do not 
prove a most fruitful nursery and forcing-house of vital 
politics. 



98 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

If, as I believe, the people of the United States stand 
ready to grant independence to the Filipinos when they 
may safely be intrusted with the use of it, and if, as I 
further believe, the great majority of Filipinos will agi- 
tate to procure it immediately, the only issue that can 
arise between them will be with reference to the time 
for the establishment of the Philippine Republic, which 
both parties agree is some day to be set up. 

Those Americans, patriotic but unversed in history, 
who desire to recreate the Filipinos in their own simili- 
tude, will always be able to demonstrate that that ori- 
ental clay is still without shape and seemliness in the 
American potter's hand, and that for a perfect product, 
a vessel of honor and glory, the American wheel must be 
kept going for years, or, perhaps, for generations, or 
possibly even for centuries. Heaven save the Filipinos 
from such an impertinent and meddlesome earthly prov- 
idence! The Filipinos are to develop along their own 
racial lines, not along ours; and it is colossal conceit and 
impudence to disparage them because they are different 
from ourselves. Capacity for independent self-govern- 
ment does not necessarily mean capacity like ours to 
administer a commonwealth like ours, but merely capac- 
ity of some sort to maintain peace and order, to uphold 
law, and to fulfil international obligations. It may be 
a matter of only a short time when the Christian Fili- 
pinos of Luzon and the Yisayas will be as well qualified 
to discharge these functions as Mexico, Peru, Argentina, 
or Venezuela. And when they are so qualified, the 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 99 

American Government has no further duty or business 
in the archipelago. Any decent kind of government of 
Filipinos by Filipinos is better than the best possibh 
government of Filipinos by Americans. 

For that reason, as I have already said, I am anxious 
to see Congress grant the Filipinos representative insti- 
tutions at once. It is no argument against this policy \J 
that even educated Filipinos do not possess our concep- 
tion of civil liberty or of official responsibility./ With 
such powers, ideas, and sentiments as they have, get 
them in harness quickly and let them tug and sweat 
under the burden of national affairs. This is the way 
men are trained in government. Political aptitudes 
and political sentiments are the gift of nature and the 
acquisition of personal experience; they cannot be do- 
nated by one person or nation to another. And if you 
do not at once take the educated Filipinos into active 
partnership in the government of the Philippine Isl- 
ands, your monopoly of power, if it does not alienate 
and embitter them, may have the still worse effect of 
tending to discourage and emasculate them. If the Fil- 
ipinos are to learn to govern themselves in the manner 
of the really free nations, the sooner they get at it, the 
better. Passive acquiescence, without partnership, in^ 
American government of the Philippines will atrophy 
their own native capacity for self-government. In that 
way their dependence would mean their servitude. The 
beginning of all national, as of all personal, freedom is 
this: " Son of man, stand upon thy feet! " America 

LofC. 



V 



100 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

cannot endow the Filipinos with liberty; but by per- 
mitting them to govern themselves, starting now with 
representative institutions and gradually enlarging their 
powers, it can at least put them under conditions favor- 
able to the development of liberty. To give them a 
good government from above without evoking their own 
active co-operation — as England has done for the people 
of India — is to sap and atrophy their own capacity for 
self-government. 

But I have wandered from my theme, which was the 
attitude of Filipinos themselves toward the great ques- 
tion of the political future of the archipelago. I have 
shown, however, that the Christian Filipinos regard in- 
dependence as the ultimate destiny of their country, and 
I have ventured to read the horoscope of coming politi- 
cal parties in Luzon and the Visayas. I see only two 
political parties, both, indeed, in accord on the funda- 
mental subject of independence, but the one — the 
nationalists — proclaiming " Behold ! now is the accepted 
time; now is the day of salvation! " and the oppor- 
tunists rallying round the conservative banner with the 
device, "JSTotyet: Mariana, to-morrow." 

It is true, indeed, that for the last two or three years 
these tendencies have been obscured. Pacification has 
been the great business; and the friendly politician's 
platform (no other, of course, was permitted) has had 
that end constantly in view. I have already explained 
how, under assurances of liberty and self-government, 
the first Philippine Commission stimulated the forma- 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 101 

tion of the Autonomist Party. This designation of the 
party accurately described it. The members of that 
organization accepted American sovereignty with the 
promise of home rule in local affairs. The issue of 
eventual independence was not raised. I think it would 
have been more fortunate had the Autonomist Party 
never changed their name or their programme. But, 
whether of their own motion or under American inspira- 
tion, they decided that it was not enough to work for the 
pacification of the archipelago with the aim of securing 
a large measure of autonomy under American sover- 
eignty. It may be that they craved a larger indepen- 
dence for the Filipinos. At any rate, they adopted the 
new name of Federal Party and made the leading plank 
in their platform the declaration that " the Philippine 
Islands should form an integral part of the United 
States of America, to be organized as a territory, with all 
the rights and privileges which the Constitution of the 
United States concedes to other territories, including 
that of becoming in time a State of the Union."* How 
seriously this programme has been taken by the mem- 
bers of the party is clear from the fact that at the con- 
vention where it was unanimously decided to petition 
Congress in that regard, I find there were present those 
able, prominent, and influential Filipinos (whom I 
am happy to call my friends) Mr. Gregorio Araneta, 
solicitor-general, and Messrs. Pardo de Tavera, Luzu- 

* La Democracia, November 4, 1901 (Draft of Petition to Congress). 
Of course this is the latest, not the earliest, formulation of the policy. 



102 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

riaga, and Legarda, the native members of the Taft 
Philippine Commission. 

I hare already expressed my opinion that this demand 
for the incorporation in the United States of America 
of the Philippine Islands as a State, or even as a terri- 
tory, is inadmissible. I need not here repeat what I 
have elsewhere said. Our people want America for the 
Americans, as, on the other hand, I recognize that the 
Philippines are for the Filipinos. All honor to the au- 
tonomists — I will call them federalists, if they prefer 
it — for the great and beneficent service which, since the 
formation of their party in the spring of 1899, they have 
rendered in the pacification of the disturbed provinces 
of the archipelago! But I say to them, in the frank- 
ness of an old friendship, that they are wasting their 
political energies and endangering their political influ- 
ence in this country by advocating a measure so imprac- 
ticable and impossible as the federal union of the Phil- 
ippines with the United States. 

So far as I can make out, this federalist plank of the 
Autonomists' platform rests on a double delusion. First 
of all, they expected the Supreme Court, in the four- 
teen diamond rings case, to decide that the constitution 
followed the flag, and that its provisions applied ex pro- 
prio vigor e, to our new Philippine annexations. Second- 
ly, they thought that if the Philippine Islands were in- 
corporated as an organic and integral part of the United 
States, the Filipinos would secure the benefits of the 
constitution without the intervention of congressional 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 103 

legislation. In other words, it was their device in a 
roundabout way to secure immediate Philippine inde- 
pendence, if not absolutely, at least in large measure, 
and especially in the shape of immunity from the arbi- 
trary and unlimited powers of Congress, of which they 
stood in dread. Since the decision of the Supreme 
Court reached the Philippines, I notice a change in the 
utterances of the party; they hark back to autonomy 
with which they began. 

" The solution," they say, " of the problem of our 
immediate future is found in the formula of autonomy, 
a government of our own, the participation of the Fili- 
pinos in the government of the Philippines, under the 
guidance and direction of America."* 

And if you ask why they ever adopted that will-o'-the- 
wisp policy of federalism, they reply, in terms not com- 
plimentary to us, though exhibiting their own natural 
longing for independence, that they hoped in this way 
to escape 

" special legislation for the Philippines, government of 
the Philippines subject to the arbitrary will of Congress 
without constitutional restrictions, all which involves 
the danger of subjecting the administration of our gov- 
ernment to the rise and fall of [American] parties, to 
presidential elections, and to the rational selfishness of 
commercialism." f 

* La Democracia, November 15, 1901. This journal is the organ of 
the party. 
f Ibid. 



104: PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

Thus the party baffled and disillusionized goes back to 
the practical position of autonomy for the present, leav- 
ing the future, officially at least, undefined. If in their 
hearts they do not cherish the ideal and faith of national 
independence, I have entirely missed the implication of 
their successive positions. The Philippines for the Fil- 
ipinos; that, I believe, is the hope and aspiration of the 
Autonomists and of all parties in Luzon and the Yis- 
ayas. And, if I am not greatly mistaken, this is what 
you will hear from a popular assembly, as soon as you 
confer representative institutions upon the Filipinos. 

As it is the policy of the United States to give the 
Filipinos liberty after the fashion of the really free na- 
tions, or an ever-increasing measure of home rule, which 
cannot but eventuate in independence, so, however 
clearly or however obscurely they may recognize the 
need in the meantime of American protection and tute- 
lage, the ultimate goal and final aspiration of the Fili- 
pinos themselves is an independent and sovereign Philip- 
pine Republic. And, as I wrote in the report of the 
first Philippine Commission, 

" Perhaps the most encouraging feature in the diffi- 
cult problem we have undertaken in the Philippines is 
the perfect coincidence between the theory and practice 
of our government, on the one hand, and the aspirations 
and ideals of the Filipinos on the other." * 

As I have already observed, since both Americans 
and Filipinos desire the political enfranchisement of the 

*P. 85. 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 105 

Filipinos, there can be no issue between them, except 
in regard to the time when an independent and sover- 
eign Philippine Republic should be established. The 
obstacles in the way of such an organization, even for 
Christian Luzon and the Yisayas, which, in 1899, 
seemed to me the most serious, w T ere the lack of homo- 
geneity, union, and intercourse among the diverse peo- 
ples of these islands — Ilocanos, Tagalogs, Yicols, Yis- 
ayans, etc. — in virtue of which they appeared rather a 
collection of disparate communities than a single com- 
mon nationality; and, secondly, the want of experience 
by the natives in government during three centuries of 
Spanish dominion, which involved not only ignorance, 
but, it was to be feared, an impairment of governing 
capacity. These, I say, appeared to me fundamental 
objections to the institution of a Philippine Republic 
immediately on the pacification of the archipelago; and 
in guessing — for no one could, in such a matter, do more 
than guess — when it might be safe and expedient to 
launch a native sovereign republic, I never ventured to 
make the interval of waiting shorter than one genera- 
tion. 

In view of subsequent facts and experiences, however, 
I think it may be not only possible, but feasible, to 
shorten the period of preparation and transition under 
American sovereignty. Pirst of all, remember that the 
first Philippine Commission reported that ultimate in- 
dependence (after a period of American tutelage) was 
the goal and aspiration of all intelligent Filipinos. Then 



106 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

we have the testimony of the Taft Commission, that the 
native officials have proved reasonably capable in the ad- 
ministration of public affairs. The test we have made 
of the governing capacity of the Filipinos has resulted 
more favorably than conld have been anticipated by de- 
duction from their previous political inexperience. Nor 
is this all, or even the principal item. Far more impor- 
tant and pregnant of hope is the more or less distinct 
emergence, under the storm and stress of the last two 
or three years, of a community of attitude, interest, sen- 
timent, and aspiration, in matters political, among all 
the Christian peoples of Luzon, the Yisayas, and the lit- 
toral of Mindanao. Undiscoverable, or at any rate un- 
discerned, if it existed, in 1899, this consciousness of 
nationality is to-day so manifest and powerful that Gen- 
eral Chaffee, looking at it with the eyes of a military 
man, has declared, or at least is reported to have de- 
clared, that the natives of these islands are all traitors 
to American sovereignty, all have their hearts set on in- 
dependence. We know that the strife and passion of war 
release pent-up mental, as well as physical, energies, and 
bring to the light of day as realities slumbering fancies, 
hopes, and sentiments which, in times of peace, merely 
flit about the background of consciousness. Scarcely 
any one in the Thirteen Colonies dreamt of indepen- 
dence when the war against British Imperialism began. 
And I suppose Lecky is right in his contention that the 
independence they achieved was actually the work of a 
small and aggressive minority. It is quite conceivable, 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 107 

therefore, that the restricted aspiration after immediate 
independence which the first Philippine Commission dis- 
cerned in the Philippines (and reported), in 1899, 
should, after three years of fighting in all or almost all 
the provinces of Luzon and the Visayas, have become a 
universal passion animating and uniting all these diversi- 
fied communities. This is all the more probable, as from 
the beginning the racial aspect of the case has been 
prominent; and, as against the white man of America, 
who succeeded the white man of Europe, the multifari- 
ous peoples of Luzon and the Visayas at least felt them- 
selves Malayans and Filipinos. I am not surprised, 
therefore, if to-day we have to reckon with a universal 
sentiment and idea of nationality among all the peoples 
of Luzon and the Visayas with a demand or desire for 
immediate independence. 

But if that be the case — and General Chaffee's state- 
ment seems to confirm it as a fact — the greatest obstacle, 
in my judgment, to the establishment in the near future 
of a Philippine Republic has been removed. When I 
wrote, in 1899, that 

" No one can foresee when the diverse peoples of the 
Philippine Islands may be molded together into a na- 
tionality capable of exercising all the functions of inde- 
pendent self-government,"* / 

though I hoped for the dawning of the day within one 
generation (as I there intimated), I did not expect as 

* Report of Eirst Philippine Commission, p. 103. 



108 PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS 

early as 1902 to learn from the commanding-general 
that, under the hammer of war and the heat of strife, 
the welding of these " diverse peoples " into a common 
nationality had been consummated. 

I shall not, however, indulge in guesses as to the date 
when the new fabric should be reared. On that point 
I desire to be informed by the Filipinos themselves. 
And I want to hear not the voice of individuals, however 
prominent, but the voice of the people. There is, how- 
ever, only one way of securing it. The people can 
speak only through the representatives they elect to a 
popular assembly or house of representatives. Here 
then is another reason why Congress should not delay 
granting representative institutions to the Filipinos. 
To secure representative institutions, they took up arms 

against Spain; the half million educated and propertied 

... 

Filipinos who would be more immediately represented 

under the limited suffrage proposed, will be conservative 
rather than radical; and what they, and the poor and 
ignorant millions of their fellow-citizens for whom they 
speak, desire, must, in the long run, prevail in the archi- 
pelago. The United States is the last people in the 
world to argue any other people into political subjection. 
And against a whole nation aspiring and struggling to 
be independent, it is as impossible to-day to draw up an 
indictment as it was when Burke repudiated the task in 
connection with the people of the Thirteen American 
Colonies. 

If the Filipinos desire independence, they should 



THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES 109 

have it, when they are qualified to exercise it. The re- 
ports of General Chaffee and Governor Taft demon- 
strate (whatever their own personal views) that the 
difficulties in the way of independence are gradually 
disappearing. Let a Philippine popular assembly or 
house of representatives say whether the Filipinos want 
independence or not, and if so, at what date they think 
the grant should be conferred, and we shall then have 
before us all the conditions necessary for the final solu- 
tion of the Philippine problem. If it appears probable, 
as recent experience seems to indicate, that the Christian 
Filipinos of Luzon and the Visayas might, at no distant 
day, govern themselves as well as the average Central or 
South American Republic, then, in the name of Ameri- 
can liberty and democracy, in the name of the political 
aspirations and ideals of the Filipinos, and in the name 
of justice and humanity, let the Philippine Republic 
be established. As President McKinley said to me 
three years ago, we went into the Philippines solely with 
the humanitarian object of conferring the blessings of 
liberty on the Filipinos. In its highest potency, liberty 
and independence are one and inseparable. 

And to repeat, what ought not to need repetition 
anywhere within the limits of our free Republic, any 
decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos is 
better than the best possible government of Filipinos 
by Americans. 



i 



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'M 14 f3<7 



